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Introduction 
This study is concerned with the extent to which modern France 
has become a "welfare state." The term "welfare state" is not 
subject to precise definition, for practically all modern governments 
are concerned in greater or lesser degree with the well-being of their 
citizens. But since the publication of the Beveridge Report in 1942, 
the phrase has become roughly descriptive of government activities 
which are redistributive in character. The welfare state, in other 
words, has to do with the use of government power as an instrument 
for the redistribution of income in society, generally with the dual 
objectives of greater equality in the distribution of money income, 
and a guarantee of some minimum standard of well-being for all 
citizens. These objectives may be brought about directly through 
a redistribution of money income, or indirectly through the pro-
vision of services to some segments of the population on some basis 
other than the costs of those services. However it may be managed, 
the existence of a welfare state means an alteration in the pattern 
of income distribution. 
Since the end of World War II France has created machinery 
for the redistribution of income as comprehensive as any now exist-
ing among western nations. In some respects, in fact, France has 
become more of a welfare state than the United Kingdom, although 
the latter is perhaps more generally looked upon as the classic 
example of this phenomenon. In the analysis which follows, this 
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study will be concerned primarily with two aspects of the welfare 
state as it functions in contemporary France. First, the study will 
show the extent to which the nation's social security system has 
become an instrument for the redistribution of income in the 
economy; and, second, it will analyze the manner in which the pat-
tern of income distribution is altered as a result of welfare expendi-
tures by the government. The study also stresses a number of im-
portant structural characteristics of the economy, and shows how 
these have influenced the functioning of the welfare state in France. 
The study is organized as follows: Chapter I is in the nature of 
an essay on the theoretical aspects of income redistribution, and its 
purpose is to provide a general framework for the empirical analysis 
that follows. Chapter 2 describes in detail the organization and 
workings of the French social security system. Chapter 3 analyzes 
income redistribution via transfer expenditures in the French 
economy on an aggregate basis, and makes a comparison with similar 
practices in the United Kingdom and the United States. Chapter 
4 is concerned with the actual distribution of money income in 
France, and the way in which this distribution is altered by the 
apparatus of the welfare state. Chapter 5, the final chapter, is in 
the nature of a commentary on the phenomenon of the welfare state. 
There is attached an appendix containing a brief comment upon 
sources and additional statistical data. 
The major portion of the research for this study was completed 
in France in 1957-58, during the tenure of my Fulbright Research 
Fellowship. I wish to express my appreciation to the International 
Educational Exchange Service of the Department of State for this 
grant, which made it possible to take time off from teaching and 
other duties at the University of Nebraska for a year of study and 
research abroad. 
VVALLACE C. PETERSON 
Paris 
June, 1958 
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I N THIS CHAPTER will be discussed some theoretical aspects of income redistribution so as to establish a framework for the later analysis of income and its redistribution in the French 
economy. Essentially, the remarks in this chapter are concerned 
with the means by which the state may modify the distribution of 
income to persons in a society. It should be fairly evident that 
governments do, willfully or not, affect the distribution of income 
in society, for the state collects taxes and dispenses various services 
or benefits, and usually taxes are not collected from nor services 
distributed to income-recipients in the same proportion. This, then, 
is the nub of the theoretical problem, for whenever some receive 
more and others less from government than what they pay to govern-
ment in the form of taxes, there is a redistribution of income. 
THE MEANING OF INCOME REDISTRIBUTION 
Ideally, analysis of the redistribution of income should attempt 
to consider the effects of all government activity that in some way 
modifies an initial distribution of income. The phrase "an initial 
distribution of income" is meant to apply to a situation in which in-
come distribution is determined on a functional basis in competitive 
markets, and the activities of government are "neutral" in the sense 
that these activities do not in any way modify the market-de-
termined distribution of income. The idea of the neutrality of 
public finance implies that by some means the citizens of a com-
munity or nation, in the absence of any formal state apparatus, 
would have purchased the same array of goods and services as they 
do collectively through the instrumentality of the state. This, of 
course, is a purely imaginary situation, but the concept of the 
neutrality of public finance is a convenient point of departure 
for a discussion of income and its distribtuioD. 
3 
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But even simply as a theoretical concept, the idea of an initial 
distribution of income subject to modification by public activity 
is not free of difficulty. Actually, the existence of the state or govern-
ment means' that the functional distribution of income will neces-
sarily be different from what it would be in the absence of a formal 
state apparatus. There are two reasons why this is likely. First, the 
functional distribution of income depends indirectly upon the 
structure of total demand, because in the market prices paid for 
the services of productive resources are linked to the kinds of goods 
and services demanded by potential buyers. And contrary to the 
remarks above pertaining to the neutrality of public finance, it is 
perhaps inevitable that the mere existence of a state, will ,modify 
the structure of total demand. It is hardly likely, in other words, 
that citizens, in the absence of the state, would prefer exactly the 
same collection of goods and services that are purchased when some 
such collective entity as the state exists. Second, it would be naive 
to attribute the functional distribution of income wholly to the 
mechanism of the competitive market. Even a casual analysis 
of the economy reveals the existence of numerous conflicts and 
power struggles centering on the distribution of income, and, these 
latter necessarily modify the way in which income distribtuion is 
shaped by market forces. The state, even if its activities are not 
redistributional in intent, will exert an influence simply because 
it cannot help but modify the outcome of power conflicts among 
private groups. It is thus necessary to accept the state as a part of 
the institutional setting of the economy, and aim the analysis, there-
by, at the public activities that can be clearly identified as having 
redistributive effects. It is still necessary to begin with an initial 
distribution of income, but this should now be interpreted to mean 
the functional distribution of income that results from some given 
level of economic activity, including that part of the national out-
put which originates in the public sector. More specifically, the 
phrase "the initial distribution of income" refers to the allocaton 
of the national income by distributive shares in the form of wages 
and salaries, rents, interests, and profits. These latter, the sum of 
which constitute the factor cost of the national output, represent 
claims to income based upon the contribution of such economic 
resources as land, labor, and capital to the market value of current 
output. Income redistribution, therefore, is concerned with the 
way in which the state may alter an initial distribution of income 
defined in this manner. 
The Theoretical Problem / 5 
The above needs to be qualified slightly, since, from the view-
point of income redistribution, the more meaningful concept is that 
of personal income. This may be defined as the money income 
actually received by persons or households, and it will differ from 
the national income because some of the factor income earned dur-
ing the productive process does not actually find its way into the 
hands of individuals as money income received. Personal income 
subject to a withholding tax, or corporate earnings retained within 
the enterprise are examples of this. Nevertheless, the concept of 
the national income remains the logical point of departure for the 
analysis, as this represents income earned from supplying resources 
to entrepreneurs, including the state as an entrepreneur; thus the 
distribution of personal income depends upon a prior distribution 
of income in the functional or factoral sense. Analysis of income 
redistribution then becomes a study of the way in which the state 
inten-enes to alter the pattern of personal income distribution 
derived. from an initial functional distribution. 
The public sector of the economy is engaged in two major types 
of activities, both of which can be measured by the expenditures 
incurred in carrying out these activities. On the one hand, the 
government provides a broad array of services to the citizens of a 
community, ranging from national defense to the provision of 
police and fire protection. In the terminology of national inc()mc 
accounting, the value of these services is equal to government ex-
penditures for goods and services.1 Many of these services are 
of a collective character in the sense that they are productive of 
benefits that are enjoyed by the recipients only through member-
ship in the community. They are, in other words,"indivisible," 
and cannot, as a practical matter, be provided for by the market 
mechanism. National defense expenditure is a case in point, for 
expenditures for this purpose clearly yield benefits to the citizens 
of a particular country, but it is equally obvious that this is a kind 
of benefit that cannot be consumed or enjoyed on an individual 
basis. The productive character of public activities results simply 
from the fact that expenditure by governmental units creates 
1 These expenditures have another dimension. for they are received as in-
come by those who sell goods and services to the government. As such, however, 
they si~ply represent factor income originating in the public sector of the 
economy and are no more redistributional of income per se than factor pay-
ments originating in the private sector. 
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values which benefit the whole community.2 Economic evaluation 
of these benefits is an especially difficult problem, because they are 
not generally distributed through the machinery of the market. 
The most feasible, though not necessarily the most satisfactory, 
solution is to value the services and benefits associated with them at 
their cost to the public sector, that is, by the amount of government 
expenditures for goods and services. 
Besides providing for a broad array of services, the state also 
engages in a variety of transfer activities. That is, some government 
expenditures are simply transfer expenditures in that they result 
only in the transfer of income from one group or person to another 
group or person. A transfer is distinguished from other government 
expenditures in that no equivalent value in either product or pro-
ductive services is received in exchange. Transfers include ex-
penditures such as old-age pensions, family allowances, unemploy-
ment compensation, veterans' benefits, interest on the public debt, 
etc. The common element in all such expenditures is that they 
do not bring a return flow of goods or services to the government. 
With respect to transfers it should be noted that some of the 
services provided by government are, in effect, nonmonetary trans-
fers. This would be true for such services as low-rental housing or 
free medical care. The recipients of these services benefit through 
obtaining them at a price below their real cost as measured by 
government expenditures for the resources necessary to provide 
the services. But since services of this kind absorb resources in 
the same way as do government expenditures for services of a col-
lective character, they should be lumped together with the latter 
and clearly distinguished from expenditures that result solely in 
a transfer of money income. 
While it is important for analytical purposes to stress the 
differences between government expenditures for goods and services 
which are productive of either collective or individual values and 
• Some economists have argued that government expenditures for goods and 
services should not be considered as a part of final output, rather, that these 
expenditures should be regarded as a type of intermediate product, because 
the existence of a stable and orderly society, made possible by such expenditures, 
is a prerequisite for aU production. The difficulty with this argument, as Alan 
T. Peacock has pointed out, is that it could be extended to practically all forms 
of consumption, since consumption is, in a broad sense, a prerequisite to pro· 
duction. See Alan T. Peacock, "The Social Services in Great Britain and the 
Redistribution of Income," in Alan T. Peacock (Ed.), Income Redistribution 
and Public Policy, London: Cape. 1954. 
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government expenditures which merely effect a transfer of money 
income, it is equally necessary to emphasize certain factors common 
to both types of expenditure. First, we should recall that all ex-
penditures result in benefits of either a monetary or nonmonetary 
nature. These benefits have their impact on the disposable real 
income of the consumer, either directly by augmenting his personal 
income, as do money transfers, or indirectly by providing the 
consumer with certain services at a lower price (or at no price) than 
would have prevailed in the absence of state action. This principle 
is clearly applicable for such things as free education or free or 
low-cost medical care, for in such instances both the recipient of 
the services and the real cost of the latter can be readily determined. 
It is less clearly apparent by what means this principle can be 
applied to government services that are collective in character, 
but it is maintained, nevertheless, that the principle has validity 
for all public activity. To argue otherwise would be to assert that 
government activity is unproductive. 
The second thing to note concerning government expenditures 
is that they require the diversion of resources from the private to 
the public sector of the economy. To the extent that the govern-
ment provides services-either collective or individual-real re-
sources are diverted to the public sector as a result of the purchase 
of goods and factor services by governmental units. It is, incidentally, 
this component of total government expenditure that is a measure 
of the "burden" of government on the economy, because such ex-
penditures represent the quantity of current real output being 
absorbed by the public sector for its purposes. Transfer expendi-
tures do not necessitate a direct diversion of real resources from 
private to public use, but they do require a diversion of financial 
resources, generally in the form of some portion of the consumer's 
current money income. 
The allocation of both real and financial resources to the public 
sector is accomplished by the process of taxation. Governments, 
in other words, normally depend upon taxation as the source of 
their revenues.3 The more meaningful significance of this is that 
8 It should be noted that the taxation proceo;s may affect the price or re-
sources, either directly or indirectly, and, consequently, there will be repercus-
sions on the structure of demand. This underscores what was pointed out 
earlier about the difficulties inherent in the idea of the neutrality of public 
finance. Moreover, to the extent that the government resorts to borrowing, there 
may be price effects with respect to commodities and resources, which may affect 
indirectly beth the si7e and composition of the national output. 
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the real cost of all public activity is, in the last analysis, borne by 
the citizens of the community in their capacity as taxpayers. If 
we grant this to be true, it logically follows that the real burden 
of taxation may vary from individual to individual and from group 
to group. As long as the proportion of total taxes paid by an 
individual or particular group differs from the proportionate share 
of the individual or group in total income received, the tax burden 
will be unequal. And what is true for taxation is equally true for 
government expenditure. That is to say, the benefits derived from 
government-provided services and money transfers will also vary 
from individual to individual and from group to group. 
Consequently, we can state as a general principle that there 
will be a redistribution of income whenever the cost of public 
activity borne by a particular group in the economy differs from 
the benefits that the same group receives from public activity. An 
ideal study of income redistribution would involve an allocation 
of the total tax burden to specific groups and an allocation of the 
benefits arising from government expenditure to the same groupS.4 
If this were done, then the difference between the total tax burden 
of the group and the total benefits received by the group would 
measure the gain or loss sustained by persons in the group as a 
result of public activity. In the following section we shall examine 
in greater detail the various means by which the state may bring 
about this result. 
THE MEANS TO REDISTRIBUTION 
There are, in effect, three broad means by which the state may 
directly affect the distribution of income.'; The first concerns the 
unequal burden of taxation; the second the unequal distribution 
of money benefits or transfers; and the third the provision by 
government of nonmonetary services to particular groups or per-
sons in the economy. Each of these will be discussed in turn. 
The tax system will be redistributive of income if particular in-
come or social groups hold a different proportion of the total 
• The specific limitations of this study with respect to the redistribution of 
income in France are set forth on page 17. 
• There will be indirect or secondary effects resulting from redistributional 
measures. In the matter of taxation, for example, the direct effect is the reduc-
tion in income resulting from the tax, while the indirect or secondary effect has 
to do with the repercussions of this upon subsequent flows of expenditure and 
income. The direct effect is subject to measurement, but the latter is not, at least 
in any practical sense. 
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money income after payment of taxes than they do before payment 
of taxes. If the tax system is at all progressive, there will be are, 
distribution of income in the direction of greater equality because 
the proportionate share of the upper-income groups in the total 
income will be reduced and the proportionate share of the lower-
income groups will be raised. A progressive tax structure must 
bring about this result because the effective rate of taxation-the 
ratio of total taxes paid to income received-increases with the 
size of the income. This means, in other words, that the propor-
tionate share of the total tax burden is greater for the upper-
income groups, hence there will be a redistribution in the direction 
of greater equality. 
The major problem in any attempt to determine the extent to 
which a given tax structure brings about redistribution of income is 
that of determining the incidence of taxation. Since most modern 
governments employ many different types of taxes to obtain their 
revenue, this is a problem of considerable complexity. The prob-
lem, moreover, has a dual aspect, for, on the one hand, it is neces-
sary to identify the persons or groups upon whom the taxis 
nominally levied, and, on the other, to identify the income re-
cipients who actually pay the tax. The latter is the problem of the 
ultimate incidence of taxation. 
Analysis of the probable incidence of different types of taxes 
can be facilitated if we divided all taxes into three broad cate-
gories.s First of all there are direct taxes, i.e., taxes levied directly 
upon income or wealth. The personal income tax, the corporation 
income tax, estate and gift taxes, and social security taxes levied 
against employees all fall within this category. Second, there are 
social security taxes paid by employers, which, for reasons discussed 
below, warrant treatment as a separate category. Finally, there 
are indirect taxes, which consist essentially of taxes whose ultimate 
incidence is presumed to be different from the person or article 
subject to the tax. Excise and sales taxes are the most common type 
of taxes in this category. 
The problem of the incidence of direct taxation is relatively 
simple because it is generally presumed that such taxes cannot be 
• No attempt is made here to treat the problem of the incidence of taxation 
in detail. Rather, the purpose is simply to emphasize those aspects of the in-
cidence protlem that are particularly relevant to the problem under considera-
tion. 
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shifted.7 This is certainly true for the personal income tax and the 
social security tax paid by the employee, although the ultimate in-
cidence of taxes on profits may be somewhat more complicated. In 
a purely competitive world in which entrepreneurs always operated 
at the point of profit maximization, a tax on profits could not be 
shifted. But in the imperfect real economic world this may not be 
true, and some shifting of such taxes may take place. The extent 
to which the latter actually happens is, perhaps, impossible to 
determine. In any event, the most realistic assumption with respect 
to direct taxation is that such taxes are not shifted. Then the 
problem becomes simply one of determination of the amount of 
direct taxes paid by particular income and/or social groups. 
Social security taxes levied against the employer present a unique 
problem, for one needs to decide whether they should be treated 
as a direct tax on income or as an indirect tax which may be shifted 
in whole or in part. Theoretically, it is feasible to view the social 
security tax levied against the employer as a direct tax on income 
if the amount of such taxes is treated as income in the personal in-
come account. In national income accounting such taxes are con-
sidered as part of the wages and salaries component of the factor 
cost of the national output, hence they are looked upon as part 
of income earned in the production process. But from the stand-
point of analysis of income redistribution this approach lacks real-
ism; it is not likely that wage-earners and other salaried persons 
regard these taxes as a part of their personal income. In fact, it 
is more in keeping with reality to view such taxes as an indirect 
levy against the employer which may be shifted. It is possible that 
these taxes could be shifted backward to the employee through a 
reduction in money wages,S but this too is not particularly realistic. 
From the employer's point of view social security taxes are simply 
a part of labor costs, and, like other costs of production, they will 
be borne by the consumer. This would particularly seem to be the 
situation when such taxes constitute a significant portion of total 
labor costs, as is the case in France. Moreover, in an inflationary era 
such as has characterized most of the post-World War II period, the 
7 Harold M. Groves, Financing Government, New York: Holt, 1939, p. 145. 
• In a purely competitive market situation the wage, including the employer's 
contribution to social security, will be equal to the marginal product of labor. 
Thus an increase in the employer's tax for social security, ceteris paribus, would 
be shifted backwards by a reduction in money wages. But this type of analytical 
model is quite remote from the reality of the labor market, particularly in an 
era of strong inflationary pressures and effective trade unionism. 
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most realistic assumption is that such taxes are shifted forward. 
Thus their ultimate incidence is on the consumer. 
With respect to the incidence of indirect taxation, no single 
generalization will suffice, although there is a strong presumption 
that their incidence is primarily on the consumer. Producers, of 
course, will regard these taxes as a part of the costs of doing busi-
ness, and will attempt to shift such taxes forward via price increases. 
The actual extent to which prices in the market change as a result 
of taxes on sales or production will depend upon a complex of 
variables, including the elasticities of demand and supply, the de-
gree of monopoly in a particular market, and the effect of the 
Diagram I 
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taxes on consumer demand. The mechanism by which price changes 
as a result of an indirect tax can be illustrated with a simple diagram 
of: price determination (see Diagram. I). 
, In Diagram I, DD and SS represent the respective demand -and 
sNpply curves before the imposition of the tax. Market price is 
at 'PI and output (or sales) at Ql' . After the taX the supply curve 
shifts to S'S', the vertical distance between SS and S'S' representing 
rhe amount of the tax. Since demand (DD) is less than perfectly 
elastic, price in the market has risen by less than the full amount 
of· the tax, i.e., the distance P1P2 • This means that the tax is borne 
pa:rtly by the consumer and partly by the producer; the'exact man-
ner in which the tax burden is divided between the consumer and 
the supplier depends upon the relative elasticities of demand and 
supply. In general, the more inelastic the deinand the more nearly 
price will rise by the full amount of the tax, and the more inelastic 
conditions of supply, the less market price wiII rise as a result of the 
tax. 
In one sense, though, it can be argued that the whole of the 
incidence is on the consumer, irrespective of the price change in 
the market as a result of the tax. This is so because the consumer 
wiII pay for a particular quantity of the commodity a price that 
is higher by the amount of the tax than he would pay for the same 
quantity in the absence of the tax. In the diagram the consumer 
pays the price P2 for the quantity Q2 after the tax, but in the ab-
sence of the tax the same quantity could be obtained at the price 
Pg • The distance PgP2 is equal to the amount of the tax. 
This diagrammatic exposition of the incidence of tax-shifting 
oversimplifies the situation because of its essentially static character. 
The whole of the incidence may very well be on the consumer -if, 
along with the imposition of the tax, there is a shift in demand. 
Thus it is possible that market price may rise by the full amount 
of the tax if the demand curve (DD) shifts significantly to the right. 
In an inflationary era effective demand wiII undoubtedly be rising, 
and this wiII make it relatively easy for producers to shift nearly 
the whole of indirect taxation forward. Thus we can conclude 
that the probabilities are that in any period characterized by strong 
inflationary pressures the incidence of indirect taxation will largely 
be on the consumer. 
As noted earlier, the benefits associated with government ex-
penditure of all types will be redistributive whenever benefits are 
received in a proportion different from income. Granted this, the 
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problem then is determination, of the incidence of the benefits of 
government activity. Benefits; like taxes, may be divided into three 
broad categories. First, there are direct money transfers to spe€ific 
individuals or groups. Second, there are nonmonetary transfers 
which are directed to specific individuals or groups. Finally, there 
are the indivisible benefits which cannot be consumed or enjoyed 
on an individual basis; 
The incidence problem for the first two categories of benefits is 
relatively simple, for it is primarily a matter of identifying the 
specific persons or groups which are the recipients of either money 
or nonmonetary transfers. Once this is done the incidence problem 
is solved, for there would be little logic in any assumption as to the 
shiftability of such transfers.9 The incidence of indivisible benefits 
is, however, another matter. While it is logical to assume that these 
benefits cannot be shifted, there is no objective way to determine 
the degree to which specific individuals or groups benefit from 
expenditures in this category. Such benefits could be allo~ated on 
a per capita basis on the assumption that all persons benefit equally 
from the existence of a well-ordered and stable society. Or they 
could be allocated in proportion to income on the assumption 
that the income of a person is a satisfactory measure of the stake 
the individual has in the continued existence of the economic and 
social order. Finally, the indivisible benefits could be distributed 
in the same proportion as taxes paid; the assumption here is simply 
that the tax burden is an adequate measure of the individual's 
stake in the social order.1° Actually all three techniques for the 
allocation of indivisible benefits are arbitrary because no objective 
criteria for this purpose exist. Perhaps the only way to avoid 
entanglement in a highly subjective argument is simply to allocate 
such benefits, if this must be done, on a per capita basis. 
PATIERNS OF INCOME REDISTRIBUTION 
The foregoing section was concerned with the major means 
available to the state for alteration of the distribution of income . 
. In this section we shall narrow the discussion somewhat and con-
sider possible ways in which the functioning of a social security 
• An exception to this are subsidies to business firms, for these, it should be 
assumed, are shifted to the consumer. 
10 The underlying assumption in. all three instances is that all persons have 
a stake in a stable order, and that the latter is the end-product of general 
government expenditures for goods and services. . . 
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system will affect the income distribution pattern. The term "social 
security" is used in a broad sense to refer to all government transfer 
expenditures that are undertaken for welfare purposes. We shall 
not be concerned with the imputation of costs and benefits result-
ing from government expenditures of a more general character. 
To analyze the way in which a social security system brings about 
a redistribution of a nation's national income, it is necessary to 
begin with the allocation of income and tax payments to different 
income and social classes. The simplest way to do this is to employ 
the techniques used in national income and social accounting, and 
for each income and/or social class to construct a table of income 
received and taxes paid, as shown below. 
Income 
1. Factor income 
2. Money transfers from 
government 
3. Monetary value of transfers 
in kind from government 
Taxes 
4. Social security taxes paid 
5. Direct taxes paid for social 
security 
6. Indirect taxes paid for 
social security 
The income recipients within the group normally receive in-
come from participation in production-i.e., factor income-and this 
income may be augmented by either the receipt of money transfers 
from government, the receipt of services from government, or both. 
The monetary value of all these constitutes the real income of the 
recipient for the period in question. On the other hand, some 
portion of all taxes paid by the individual income recipients will 
be used to finance the welfare expenditures of the government. 
There will be, then, a redistribution of income for members of 
the income and/or social class whenever the monetary value of all 
social security benefits differs from the sum of taxes paid by mem-
bers of the group for the support of social security. In the above 
table redistribution takes place whenever 2 -+- 3 is different from 
4 -+- 5 -+- 6. 
From the point of view of the group to which the individual 
belongs there will be a redistribution of income in favor of the 
group if the benefits received are in excess of the social security 
taxes paid; if the opposite is true there will be a redistribution of 
income at the expense of the group in question and in favor of 
other groups in the economy. Beyond this, there are a number of 
different possibilities with respect to the actual pattern of income 
redistribution that may emerge as a result of the workings of a 
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social security system. These possibilities will be briefly explored 
in the following paragraphs. 
First, it is possible, in theory, that welfare or social security 
expenditures are financed wholly by transfers from one social class 
to another. In other words, it is possible that the redistribution 
of income effected by a social security system may be wholly along 
class lines. The system might be so constituted, for example, that 
wage-earners are the chief beneficiaries, while the costs of the system 
fall almost wholly on other social classes. The Labour Party in 
Great Britain, it would seem, envisaged a system along these lines 
when it came to power after the war, although in actuality the 
workings of the British social security system turned out quite 
differently.ll 
A second possibility is that social security benefits are financed 
wholly by income transfer within the social class. This would be 
the case, for example, if taxation for social security was uniform 
within the group, but members of the group benefitted from social 
security expenditure in varying proportions. The family allowance 
feature of the French social security structure tends to operate in 
this fashion, as the cash benefits received are directly dependent 
upon the number of children in a family. The extent to which a 
social security system actually functions in this way depends upon 
the nature of the benefits and eligibility for the latter, as well as 
the kind of taxes imposed to finance the system. In a general sense 
this tendency is operative in any system in which the active popula-
tion as a whole is taxed and important benefits (e.g., pensions) flow 
to nonactive elements of the population. 
It is also possible that a system might function in such a way as to 
bring about a redistribution of income from the upper-income to 
the lower-income groups. Insofar as income groups are roughly 
identifiable with particular social classes, this possibility is similar 
to the first mentioned above. However, this is rarely the case in 
actuality. In any event, this particular pattern of redistribution 
would come about if practically all the beneficiaries of social ex-
penditure were found in the lower-income brackets and the system 
were financed wholly by a progressive tax on incomes. This, of 
course, is not the usual practice, for most existing systems adhere 
to a greater or lesser degree to the principle that the beneficiaries 
11 }'indley Weaver, "Taxation and Redistribution in the United Kingdom," 
Review of Economics and Statistics, August, 1950, pp. 201-213. 
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should contribute to the support of the system. But it is true in 
practice that this pattern frequently emerges with respect to more 
general government expenditures of a welfare character (i.e., educa-
tion, public health, etc.) whenever there exists a significant degree 
of progression in the tax structure. 
Determination of the pattern of income redistribution that re-
sults from the functioning of a system of social security cannot, of 
course, be separated from the general question of the incidence 
of taxation. This is so because the whole matter hinges, in a sense, 
on identification of the groups that actually pay the cost of the 
various social services. Some remarks, therefore, are in order at 
this point with respect to the possible and/or probable incidence 
of taxes that may be employed to finance social security expenditure. 
The incidence problem would be quite simple if the system were 
wholly self-financed, that is, financed by direct taxes levied on the 
beneficiaries of the system. If this were the case it would be relative-
ly easy to determine the extent to which there was a redistribution of 
income between income or social groups. But in actual practice 
this is seldom the case. Two difficulties in particular are likely to 
be encountered with respect to the finances of the system and their 
incidence. 
First, social security taxes proper-i.e., taxes levied directly on 
the beneficiaries of the system-may not be adequate to cover all 
outlays of funds by the system.· A part of the latter's costs, in other 
words, must be covered by the general revenue of the government. 
This creates the additional problem of determining what propor· 
tion of other direct taxes on individuals are to be allocated to social 
security expenditure. There is the parallel problem of the incidence 
of these taxes. Even these problems would not be especially difficult 
of solution if all government expenditures were financed by direct 
taxation and if the government did not incur a deficit. Unfortunate-
ly these admittedly ideal conditions seldom exist in the real eco-
nomic world. 
Second, difficulties of a particularly complex character will arise 
whenever a government depends upon indirect taxation for a part 
of its revenue. This is so because of the price effects that are as-
sociated with indirect taxation. The existence of indirect taxation 
as a major source of revenue requires both that the incidence of 
these taxes be determined and that the proportion of total revenue 
raised by these taxes that is to be allocated to social security ex-
penditure be determined. The former requires a precise knowledge 
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not only of income but, more importantly, of consumption patterns 
for all income and social groups; all too frequently such knowledge 
does not exist. Moreover, any allocation of tax revenue from 
different tax sources to social security expenditure will be arbitrary, 
for there is no way to determine for most government budgets the 
exact use of revenue from a particular source. 
The difficulties discussed above as respects determination of the 
incidence of social security taxes suggest a final remark of a general 
nature about the probable pattern of income redistribution. If the 
system is not wholly self-financed, it is quite probable that all 
income or social groups in the society may experience a net gain 
insofar as the monetary or cash benefits of the system are concerned. 
That is, all groups may receive more in the way of direct money 
income from the system than they pay in direct taxes to support the 
system. This has dearly been the case in France.12 It may be the 
result whenever a significant portion of total monetary benefits are 
financed by indirect taxation. If this is the situation, it means that 
a portion of the costs of the system is diffused throughout the 
economy by the price mechanism, and thus the final incidence of 
the costs is not readily determined. Under such circumstances no 
dear picture of the total amount of real income redistribution 
brought about by the functioning of the social security system is 
obtainable. But even if the above is the actual situation, it is also 
true that income and social groups will not necessarily benefit to 
the same degree, and it is thus possible to develop a partial picture 
of the redistribution of money income within a society. In a general 
way the net gain (or loss) experienced by members of an income or 
social group as a result of the social security system will be measured 
by the ratio of taxes paid to support social security to money bene-
fits received. \Vhile this is not a perfect measure of income re-
distribution, it is one for which reasonably accurate data can be 
obtained, and it does provide a basis for intergroup comparisons. 
THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
The foregoing discussion of income distribution and its modi-
fication by the state has stressed not only the theoretical aspects 
of the problem, but the quite formidable difficulties pertaining to 
the incidence of taxes and benefits that confront anyone attempting 
an empirical analysis of income redistribution in a particular society 
12 See Chapter 4. 
18 / The Welfare State in France 
Because of these things, this study concerns itself with the redistri-
bution of income in France in a limited sense_ Specifically, the 
study is limited to an analysis of the redistribution of money in-
come that results from the combined effect of direct taxes on in-
dividuals and the receipt of money transfers by individuals_ No 
attempt is made to allocate other types of social benefits to specific 
groups, nor to allocate the burden of indirect taxation among the 
same groups_ In spite of these limitations, it has been possible to 
construct a fairly clear picture of the workings of France's social 
security system, and to show in particular the extent to which the 
system alters the pattern of money income distribution between 
social groups and income classes_13 
13 The social classes treated in this study are farmers; self-employed workers in 
areas other than agriculture; wage-earners, including farm laborers; and the non-
active popul:Hion_ The latter includes all persons not actually employed for 
wages or salary nor engaged in a business or profession-students, retired per-
sons, members of the clergy, etc. It also includes the population of institutions_ 
It does not include, of course, the dependents of persons in the first three 
categories. 
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FRANCE'S EXISTING social security structure largely resulted from the enthusiasm for sweeping social and economical reform that characterized the immediate postliberation period. In 
1944 the National Council of Resistance issued the so-called "Re-
sistance Charter," which, among other things, demanded a complete 
system of social security which would protect the worker against 
threats to his livelihood inherent in an industrial society.1 All 
of the major French political parties adopted this Resistance 
Charter prior to the general elections of October, 1945, and as a 
consequence this document became the basis for economic and 
social policy in the early days of the Fourth Republic. 
Actually the framework for a revamped social security system 
was created even before the Charter was issued. In an ordonnance of 
October 4, 1945, the Provisional government (the de Gaulle regime) 
reorganized the various existing social security schemes into a 
general system.2 This, along with a second ordonnance on October 
19, created a unified system for the administration of all social 
Most of the information in this chapter has been secured directly from 
the Ministry of Social Affairs in Paris. Figures given for the monetary value of 
the various benefits are those in effect as of June, 1958. 
1 This document is reprinted in David Thomson's Democracy in France, 
London, 1946, pp. 257259. 
• A system of compensation for industrial accidents was first· introduced in 
France in 1898. In 1910 an old-age pension system for workers and peasants was 
established. In 1930 this legislation was revised and expanded to include social 
insurance for illness, invalidity, maternity, old age, and death. The system, 
though, was limited to wage-earners whose income did not exceed a certain 
ceiling. FamIly allowances were introduced on a limited scale in 1932, and ex-
panded to the Whole population in 1939. 
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services, and, equally important, formulated the principle that the 
latter should be extended to the whole of the population.3 
As is the case in most modern countries, the French system has 
two broad objectives: first, it attempts to guarantee all citizens 
some minimum standard of material well-being; and, second, it 
aims at a more equal distribution of the national income. Beyond 
this, France's system has been strongly influenced by the nation's 
demographic situation. Prior to 1940 France was faced with a 
continuous and increasingly serious decline in the national birth 
rate. Fortunately for France's future there has been since 1945 a 
sharp reversal of this trend,4 but nevertheless the concern felt by 
many French for the gloomy population picture in the interwar 
period largely accounts for the significant role that the system of 
family allowances occupies in the postwar social security structure. 
Another consequence of the prewar demographic situation, and of 
the first world war as well, is that there are a disproportionate num-
ber of persons, particularly women, in the older age groups. This 
necessitates increased aid to the aged through pensions, medical care, 
and other forms of assistance. In fact, pre- and postwar demographic 
trends have combined to create a population structure in which the 
proportion of persons in the highest and lowest ranges of the age 
pyramid has sharply increased relative to persons in the middle 
ranges, i.e., the active population. In sum, the two major factors 
that have largely shaped France's present social security system have 
been the postwar demands for social and economic reform and the 
nation's demographic problems. 
THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN FRANCE 
France's social security system appears to be excessively complex, 
because there does not exist a single system for the administration of 
3 This hl!.s not been realized in practice, for the self-employed participate in 
the general system only with respect to family allowances. There is a special 
scheme to provide pensions for persons in this social class. See pp. 34-38 in this 
chapter. 
• In 1920 the birth rate in France was 21.4 (!ler 1,000 inhabitants)" and the 
death rate 17.2; in 1930 the birth rate was 18.0 and the death rate 15.6. Bv 1939 
the birth rate had fallen to 14.6 and the death rate to 15.3. After the w~r the 
birth rate rose to a postwar peak of 20.9 in 1949, and then declined slightly to 
18.5 in 1955. The death rate continued to decline, reaching a level of 12.2 in 
1955. These changes have brought about an increase in France's population 
from 39.8 million in 1940 to 43.4 million in 1956. See Jean-Marcel Jeanneney, 
Tableaux Statistiques Telatits Ii l'economie tran~aise etl'economie mondiale 
Paris: Armand Colin, 1957, pp. 9, II. 
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all social security benefits. The ordonnances of October, 1945, 
created a general system (regime general) of social security which 
covers about 50 percent of the active population, but alongside 
this general system there are a number of special systems, or 
schemes, notably for workers in agriculture, mining, and the na-
tionalized industries, and civil servants. Some of these special 
schemes were created before the war, and because benefits are higher 
in some instances, workers belonging to the special schemes did not 
want to have the latter incorporated into the general system. Actual-
ly, there is a considerable intermingling of the general and special 
systems, for workers in the industries mentioned above do draw 
certain benefits from the general system. The discussion which 
follows is applicable primarily to the general system; the major 
special schemes will be discussed in the last section of this chapter. 
The general system embraces three major types of benefits. 
These are social insurance proper, the system of family allowances, 
and an insurance program for industrial injuries and occupational 
diseases. Administration of the system is the responsibility of the 
General Director of Social Security, who is a civil servant, and whose 
office is a part of the Ministry of Social Affairs.5 
Social Insurance Proper 
Social insurance proper covers the risks of sickness and long 
sickness, maternity, disability, and old age. Social insurance proper 
applies to the whole of Metropolitan France, and to the departe-
ments of Guadeloupe, Guyane Fran<,;aise, Martinique, and Reunion 
in France's overseas territories. All workers employed under con-
tract of services are covered, irrespective of the amount of earnings 
or the nature of the contract. Foreigners employed in France are 
entitled to the same benefits as French nationals. At present about 
10 million workers, or 70 percent of the wage-earners, are covered 
by social insurance proper. 
The major features of social insurance proper may be sum-
marized as follows: 
1. Sickness Insurance: These benefits involve the refund of 
medical expenses (regarded as a benefit in kind by the French 
authorities), and the payment of an allowance to compensate for 
the loss of earnings during the period of sickness. Persons covered 
by sickness insurance are reimbursed for the cost of hospitalization 
• The administrative organization of the social security system is discussed 
in detail on pages 32-34. 
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and drugs and the fees of physicians and dentists in an amount 
equal to 80 to 100 per cent of the cost or fee, depending upon the 
type of treatment. Physicians and dentists are not, as is the case in 
England, employees of the state; a scale of fees is established by 
consultation between the social security administration and the 
appropriate professional (medical or dental) organization. Medical 
practitioners are not legally obligated to observe the scale of fees, 
so the actual extent to which a patient can recover the cost outlay 
in a particular illness may vary. In practice, the fees charged are 
largely in accordance with the income of the patient, as is usually 
the situation where the practice of medicine is wholly private. 
The allowance paid as compensation for a loss of earnings is 
equal to one-half the worker's daily wage, and is paid from the 
fourth day following the cessation of work. After the thirty-first 
day of illness the allowance may be raised to two-thirds of the 
worker's daily wage if the insured worker has at least three de-
pendent children. For ordinary illnesses the allowance is paid for 
a maximum period of six months. For long-term sickness-i.e., an 
illness that necessitates cessation of work for more than six months 
-there are special provisions. In this event the insured worker and 
members of his family are entitled to 100 percent reimbursement 
for all medical expenses incurred during the period of the illness, 
and the payment of the allowance to compensate for the loss of 
income continues for a maximum period of three years. 
2. Maternity Insurance: These benefits are available to all em-
ployed women covered by social insurance proper; they are to be 
distinguished from other maternity benefits that are a part of the 
system of family allowances and are paid to all women during and 
after a pregnancy, irrespective of the fact of employment. Maternity 
benefits for employed women include the complete refund of all 
medical and hospital expenses incurred as a result of a pregnancy, 
although again the reimbursement of these expenses is based upon 
a fixed scale of fees. Dependents of the insured are also eligible for 
a refund of medical expense they may have incurred as a result of 
illness during the insured's pregnancy. The insured is also paid a 
daily allowance computed in the same manner as the allowance 
for sickness insurance for a period of six weeks before the birth of 
the child and eight weeks after the birth. This daily allowance, 
however, is paid only on the condition that the insured woman 
does not go back to work for at least six weeks after the birth of 
her child. 
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3. Disability Insurance: Benefits are paid to any person who is 
prevented for physical reasons from earning in any trade or pro-
fession a wage or salary exceeding one-third of the normal wage or 
salary for workers in the same district and in the same occupation 
or trade. The insured person is entitled to a complete refund for 
all medical expenses arising out of the infirmity that is the cause 
of his disability, and is entitled to full sickness benefits for any 
other illnesses. The disabled person also is eligible for a pension, 
the amount of which is generally equal to 30 percent of his average 
annual salary or wage for the ten years preceding his disablement. 
If his disablement is total, the pension is increased to 40 percent 
of the annual wage or salary, and may be further augmented if 
the disabled person requires the constant attention of two persons. 
At present the minimum pension for disability is 72,380 francs 
($170) per year.6 The disability pension continues until the bene-
ficiary is 60, and is then replaced by an old-age pension of at least 
equal amount. As is the case with all cash benefits paid under the 
social security program, the disablement pension is subject to 
periodic review, and may be increased in the event of general rise 
in the level of wages. 
4. Old-Age Pension Insurance: These benefits apply to employed 
persons who have attained a prescribed age and meet certain other 
conditions. To qualify for a full old-age pension a worker must 
have attained the age of 60 and must have been employed for a 
period of 30 years in a trade or profession covered by social insur-
ance proper. Under these conditions the worker will receive the 
maximum pension, which amounts to 20 percent of the worker's 
annual wage or salary for the ten years prior to his retirement. 
In the event the insured continues to work after the age of 60 the 
pension, when granted, is increased by four percent of the annual 
basic wage during every year of employment after the age of 60. 
Moreover, the pension may be further increased if the insured has 
reared three or more children, and if the insured has a dependent 
wife or husband. Persons not eligible for a full pension are en-
titled to a partial pension, provided they have completed a mini-
mum of 15 years' employment in a covered occupation. The 
• The dollar value of the wcial security benefits is determined on the basis 
of the existing exchange rate (June, 1958) of 420 French francs to the U. S. 
dollar. Since price and consumption patterns differ widely between France and 
the United States, the dollar figures give only an approximation of the real 
value of the social securi ty benefits. 
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amount of the partial pension will be one·half the normal pension 
for a person with just 15 years of covered employment, and will 
increase proportionately with the actual number of years of covered 
employment between 15 and 30. 
Since the above provisions were incorporated into French law 
by the ordonnances of October, 1945, no workers have fulfilled the 
required conditions for a full pension. It may be noted parenthet-
ically that when the full effect of the provisions for old-age pensions 
begins to be felt (around 1970), there will be a considerable in-
crease in the transfer of income from the active to the nonactive 
population, as the amounts paid for a full pension will be relatively 
high. Whether the French economy, in view of the already existing 
high level of transfer expenditures, can sustain this augmentation 
remains to be seen. 
Because the provisions for a full pension are not yet fully in 
effect, there exists a supplementary system of allowances for retired 
workers (l'allocation aux vieux travailleurs salaries). This latter is 
designed to provide old·age pensions for workers who cannot 
qualify for the regular pension because of insufficient contributions. 
To be eligible for this allowance a worker must have been em-
ployed in Metropolitan France for a period of five years after 
reaching the age of 50. This period is increased by one year for 
each year after 1946, up to a maximum of 15 years. 'Workers who 
may not meet these conditions are still eligible for a pension if they 
have had employment for 25 years. The pension is granted at the 
age of 65, or at age of 60 if the worker is not fit for employment 
after this age. It is only granted to a worker if his total income is 
less than 201,000 francs ($478) per year, or 258,000 francs ($614) per 
year if the applicant is married. The amount of the pension is 
72,380 francs ($170) per year for workers living in cities with more 
than 5,000 inhabitants, and 68,640 francs ($163) per year for workers 
in all other localities, except the Paris region. Workers residing 
there are allowed 75,780 francs ($180) per year. As is the case 
with the regular pension, the amount paid may be increased if 
the worker is married, or has raised more than three children. 
5. Death and Survivors Insurance: In the event of the death of 
a worker covered by social insurance proper, the system provides 
for the payment of a lump sum to the dependents of the insured 
worker, and, under certain conditions, payment of a pension to 
the widow (or widower) of the deceased. The amount of the lump 
sum payment, or "death grant," is equal to three months' salary 
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of the deceased worker, except that it cannot exceed a maximum of 
150,000 francs ($357). The widow of an insured person is entitled 
to a pension if she is permanently disabled and not in receipt of a 
pension for old age. A widower incapable of work also receives a 
widower's pension if his wife, at the time of her death, had been 
the main support of the family. These pensions are only paid if the 
applicant is under 60, and the minimum amount of the pension 
is 36,]90 francs ($86) per year. 
The System of Family Allowances 
The most original and most important part of the French social 
security structure is the system of family allowances. The system 
actually originated before the war, as a decree of July 29, 1939 
(Code de la famille), created a comprehensive system of family 
allowances for the whole of the active population.7 The war, how-
ever, prevented the Code from coming fully into effect, and after 
the war the legislation was revised and the present system came 
in to existence.8 
The family allowance system differs from social insurance proper 
in that the benefits do not depend upon the actual wage or salary 
of the worker, and all benefits are in the form of cash payments. 
All persons resident in France, including foreigners employed in 
France, are eligible for family allowances, providing, of course, 
they satisfy the requirements applicable for each type of benefit. 
The amount of the benefits, which are tax free, is determined on 
the basis of a standard wage computed for each locality. At present 
the standard wage for the Paris region is 19,000 francs (about $45) 
per month, and the standard wage for other localities is computed 
as a fixed percentage of the standard wage for the Paris region. 
The family allowance system consists of the following type of 
benefits: (1) family allowances proper; (2) allowances to a single 
wage-earner; (3) prenatal and maternity allowances; and (4) a 
housing allowance. The chief characteristics of each of these 
benefits are described below. 
1. Family Allowances Proper: Family allowances proper consist 
, Private schemes for family allowances existed in a number of industries in 
France before the First World War. In 1932 (law of March 11), a system of 
family allowc.nces for wage· earners, financed wholly by employers, was estab· 
lished. In 1939 the Code de la Famille extended family allowances to the whole 
population. 
• Law of August 22, 1946. 
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of a monthly cash payment to each family with at least two de-
pendent children. The actual amount of the allowance depends 
upon the prevailing standard wage in the locality and the number 
of children in the family. For a family with two children it is equal 
to 22 percent of the standard wage; for the third and each sub-
sequent child the amount is 33 percent of the standard wage. The 
family allowance is normally paid with respect to each child until 
the age of 15, or if the child continues schooling after 15, until 
the age of 20. For the Paris region the amounts paid monthly 
would be as follows: 
For two children - 4,180 francs ($10) 
For three children - 10,450 francs ($25) 
For four children - 16,720 francs ($39) 
For five children - 22,990 francs ($54) 
2. Allowances to a Single Wage-Earner: Family allowances 
proper are supplemented by the allowance to a single wage-earner 
(allocation de salaire unique) which applies to families or house-
holds dependent on one source of income from employment, or to 
households in which the wage or salary of one of the parents, when 
both are employed, does not exceed one-third of the standard wage 
for the locality. In this instance the payment is made to a family 
with only one dependent child, and the allowance available under 
this scheme is added to the amounts paid under family allowances 
proper as long as the source of income for the household is as 
described above. The amounts paid as a percentage of the standard 
wage are: 20 percent for a single child of less than five years of 
age; 10 percent for a single child more than five but less than ten 
years of age; 40 percent for two children; and 50 percent for three 
or more children. For the Paris region the standard wage for the 
allowance to a single wage-earner only is fixed at 18,000 francs per 
month. A family entitled to both family allowances proper and 
the allowance to a single wage-earner would receive the following 
amounts monthly: 
Number of Children Family Allowances Allowance to a 
in the Family Proper Single Wage· Earner Total 
One (younger than 5) 3,600 ($8) 3,600 ($8) 
One (older than 5) 1,800 ($4) 1,800 ($4~ 
Two 4,180 ($10) 7,200 ($17) II,380 ($3 ) 
Three 10,450 ($25) 9,000 ($21) 19,450 ($46) 
Four 16,720 ($39) 9,000 ($21) 25,720 ($60) 
Five 22,990 ($54) 9,000 ($21) 31.990 ($7./) 
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There is also a special arrangement for families with more than 
three children in which the income of the head of the household 
is derived from a nonagricultural, professional activity, and in 
which the other parent devotes herself solely to the care of the 
children and the household. The sums under this arrangement 
are added to the family allowances proper, and are a percentage of 
the standard wage equal to 15 percent for three children; 25 per-
cent for four; 40 percent for five; and 50 percent for six or more. 
3. Prenatal and Maternity Allowances: These benefits consist of 
cash payments to a family during a pregnancy and after the birth 
of a child. Prenatal allowances are paid from conception to the 
birth of the child, provided the prospective mother submits to three 
examinations during the course of the pregnancy, and the amount 
is equal to 25 per cent of the standard wage for the locality. This 
allowance is separate from the daily allowance paid for women 
covered by social insurance proper. The maternity allowance con-
sists of a lump sum payable after the birth of each child. The 
amount of this allowance is twice the standard wage for the locality 
for the first child, and one and one-third times the standard wage 
for each subsequent child. For women over 25, the first birth must 
occur within two years of marriage; the second within three years 
of the first birth or five years of marriage; and the third within three 
years of the second birth, or eight years of marriage. For women 
under 25 there are no restrictions on payment of the maternity 
allowance. 
4. The Housing Allowance: This is a rental grant paid to fami-
lies that spend a certain proportion of their income for rent, and 
live in residences that meet certain minimum conditions of health 
and sanitation. The amount of the housing allowance is computed 
on the basis of the difference between the actual rent paid by a 
family and a minimum standard rent established for various classes 
of dwellings and various localities.9 Against this difference a per-
centage is applied to determine the actual amount paid; the per-
centage varies with the number of children in a family, ranging 
from 40 percent for a young married couple without children to 
95 per cent for a family with four or more children. The number 
of families that benefit from the housing allowance is relatively 
• There also is a ceiling on the actual rent a family may pay in order to bene-
fit from the housing allowance. This ceiling varies with the condition of the 
dwelling and the number of children in the family. 
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small, partly because of the low level of rents in general, and 
partly because such a large proportion of houses and apartments in 
France do not meet the minimum standards for health and sanita-
tion. Grants are also paid to persons who undertake expenditures 
to improve their dwellings or who move to better their living condi-
tions. These are based on the standard wage, and range from 135 
to 220 percent of the latter, depending upon the locality and the 
number of children in the family. 
Insurance for Industrial Injuries and Occupational Disease 
The third facet of the French social security system consists of 
an insurance program designed to provide care for the victims of 
industrial accidents or occupational disease_lo The coverage of this 
program is practically the same as for social insurance proper-i.e., 
all employed persons-except that certain nonemployed persons are 
also covered, such as students in technical and vocational schools. 
Persons not covered by the legislation may be voluntarily insured 
if they register with the local social security office in their area. 
Four types of benefits are provided for those eligible under this 
program. These are: payments for medical care; a daily allowance 
in lieu of wages for temporary incapacity resulting from an in-
dustrial accident or occupational disease; an annuity or pension in 
the event of permanent incapacity; and annuities for the dependents 
of the victim of a fatal accident. 
All medical expenses incurred in the treatment of a physical 
incapacity resulting from an industrial injury or occupational dis-
ease are paid by the social security administration. Unlike the sick-
ness insurance provision of social insurance proper, wherein the 
beneficiary must pay the physician himself and be refunded the 
prescribed proportion of the costs, the social security administra-
tion pays all costs directly to the physician or hospital concerned_ 
The beneficiary has a free choice of both hospital and physician_ 
The daily allowance for temporary incapacity is paid from the 
first day following the cessation of work. For the first 15 days of 
incapacity it is paid on a daily basis, but after this is not payable for 
nonworking days. The payment is terminated on the date the 
worker returns to full-time employment, or when the disability is 
declared permanent. The amount of the allowance is equal to 
one-half the worker's daily wage, except that after the twenty-ninth 
,. Law of October 30, 1946. 
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day of incapacity it is increased to two-thirds of the daily wage. 
If .the temporary incapacity lasts more than four months, the 
allowance may be reviewed, and possibly increased, if, in the mean-
while, there has been a general increase in wages. 
The annuity for permanent incapacity provides a pension for 
persons totally or partially disabled as a result of industrial injury 
or occupational disease. The amount of the pension depends on 
both the degree of disablement of the worker and his annual earn-
ings prior to the injury or illness. In fixing the amount of the 
pension, the worker's earnings in the twelve months prior to dis-
ablement are used as a base wage, and then against this a some-
what complicated formula is applied to determine the actual pen-
sion the worker will receive.l1 Disabled persons requiring the 
contant attention of another individual are eligible for a 40 per-
cent increase in the amount of the annuity. 
The dependents of the victim of a fatal accident are also en-
titled to a pension or annuity based upon the annual earnings of 
the victim, the latter being computed in the same manner as for a 
disability pension. For a widow (or widower) the pension is equal 
to 30 percent of the computed earnings, providing the marriage 
took place before the accident, and providing, too, that there had 
not been a divorce or separation. Children up to the age of 16 are 
entitled to an annuity to the extent of 15 percent of the computed 
earnings for each of the first two children in the family, and 10 
percent for each subsequent child under the age of 16. Grand-
children and parents of the victim are also entitled to an annuity, 
provided they were dependent upon the victim. Grandchildren 
11 In computing the pension, all the worker's earnings in the prior twelve 
months are taken into account only if they do not exceed a prescribed amount. 
The portion of the annual wage between 717,746 and 2,870,894 francs counts 
only as one· third, and the amount in excess of 2,R70,894 francs is not counted 
at all. The wage obtained in this fashion is then multiplied by a percentage 
figure computed by counting the degree of disablement under 50 percent at 
one-half. and the degree of disablement over 50 percent at one and one-half. 
Thus, for a worker with 90 percent disability, the percentage figure would be: 
50 + 10 x 3 = (25 + 60) = 85. 
2" -2-
If the worker's wage before disablement had been 800,000 francs per year, the 
pension would then be computed as follows: 
First part ................................................................ ................. ....... 717,746 francs 
Second part (Vs of 800,000 less 717,746) ... ........................ 27,418 francs 
Total allowed wage ...................... 745,164 francs 
Pension equals 85% of 745,164 francs or 633,389 francs. 
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are entitled to the same benefits as the victim's children, while 
parents are eligible for an annuity of 10 percent of the computed 
earnings. However, the total of annuities paid to grandchildren 
and parents cannot exceed 30 percent of the computed earnings, 
and, moreover, the total of annuities paid to all dependent'! can-
not exceed 75 percent of the latter. 
THE FINANCING OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
In principle the benefits paid by the general system (regime 
general) are financed wholly by contributions from either the em-
ployees or employers. In practice this is not the case, as the social 
security accounts have been in deficit in recent years. Table I below 
shows for the period 1951-55 the proportion of total expenditures 
for social security, including the special regimes, covered by the tax 
on employees, the tax on employers, and by the general budget. 
The latter, of course, measures the deficit of the accounts. 
TABLE I 
Financing of Social Security Benefits: 1951-55 
(in percent) 
Means of Finance 
Taxes on Employees 
Taxes on Employers 





















Source: Ministere des Finances, Statistiques et Etudes Financieres, No. 85, January, 1956. 
Social insurance proper is financed by two taxes, one on the 
employer and the other on the employee. The latter pay a tax of 
6 percent on the portion of their wages below the ceiling of 600,-
000 francs ($1,430) per year. The employer's contribution is 10 
percent of all wages below this ceiling. The employee's contri-
bution is deducted from his wages by the employer. 
The contribution or tax for the system of family allowances is 
borne entirely by the employer; the rate at present is 16.75 percent 
of the standard wage, which, as already pointed out, varies with 
the locality. The contribution of the self-employed varies in 
accordance with the individual's net income on the basis of a scale 
established by ministerial decree. 
Insurance for industrial injuries and occupational disease is 
financed wholly by a tax on the business firm; the amount of the 
contribution is fixed for each firm by the regional social security 
office on the basis of the risks appropriate to each firm. In recent 
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years the average rate of contribution has been between two and 
three percent of the standard wage. This procedure is supple-
mented by a system of additional contributions and/or rebates, 
designed to meet either exceptional risks in particular firms or 
special achievements in the field of accident prevention. 
In addition to these three main taxes for the support of social 
security. there are certain other charges of a broadly social character 
imposed upon the employer. Table II below shows the total of 
"social" charges paid by the employer as a percentage of direct 
money wages. 
TABLE II 
Social Security Charges Levied against Employers 
as a percent of direct labor costs 
Type of Tax 1946 1948 1950 1952 
Social Insurance 8.8 8.4 8.3 8.7 
Family Allowances 9.4 12.1 13.2 14.5 
Industrial Accidents 3.8 2.8 2.8 3.2 
Other- 4.9 5.1 5.1 6.4 







• Includes an apprenticeship tax, a special tax for the development of workers' housing, 
and the cost to the employer of paid vacations, which, in France, is not treated as 
a pan of the regular wage hill. 
1!<>urce: Institut National de la statistique et des etudes economiques, .ttudes et Con-joncture, No.8, August, 1957. 
While the detailed analysis of the transfer burden imposed 
on France's economy by the social security system is reserved for 
the following chapter, several remarks are in order at this point 
with respect to the financing of the system. The data in the above 
tables show that the bulk of social security expenditures are largely 
financed by the employers, and that the tax burden on the employer 
for welfare purposes (Table II) is, for all practical purposes, in-
direct in character. Employers, in other words, undoubtedly regard 
these charges as part of their labor costs, and expect them ulti-
mately to be covered by the prices of goods and services sold. 
This means, first, that a considerable portion of the real costs 
of social security are rather widely diffused throughout the economy 
by ~e price mechanism. As a consequence of this it is probable 
that a significant part of the real costs of social security are borne 
by beneficiaries of the system in the form of higher prices, although 
the general public in France is not much aware of this. 
The indirect character of the taxes employed to finance social 
security expenditure also means that the impact of the system of 
the distribution of real income can be determined only within 
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rather narrow limits. The incidence of the benefits of the system 
is readily determined, as is the incidence of direct taxes on the 
beneficiaries, but the same cannot be said for the incidence of in-
direct taxation because of the absence of detailed data on con-
sumption patterns for social and/or income classes. At this point 
the only safe generalization is that the chief beneficiaries of the 
system probably pay enough in additional consumption (Le., in· 
direct) taxes to pay for the benefits-money and otherwi5e-they 
actually receive. 
Finally, it can be argued with considerable conviction that the 
charges for social eXPrenditure imposed on the business firm are a 
major factor accounting for the relatively higher prices prevailing 
in France for consumer goods as compared to other countries in 
western Europe. This is not to argue that the level of expenditure 
for welfare purposes in France is in any sense "too high." for this 
is a question of social values and priorities. but simply to emphasize 
that there is a real cost involved in these expenditures, and that 
the method chosen to finance them has various repercussions for 
the economy. In France the major impact of the latter has been 
on the price of consumer goods because of the extent to which in-
direct taxation is employed as a means of finance.12 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
Administration of the general system (regime general) is the 
responsibility of the Minister of Social Affairs, an official of cabinet 
rank. Directly beneath him is the General Director of Social 
Security, who is a 'Civil servant and responsible for the detailed 
operation of the system. Administration is decentralized. as there 
are 16 regional directorates in Metropolitan France, the heads of 
which exercise powers within each region comparable to the Gen-
eral Director for the whole country. These government depart-
ments constitute the essential administrative framework of the 
system. 
In the actual day-to-day operations of the system the key organi-
zational units are the Caisses (Offices or Funds), which are self-
governing corporate entities endowed with financial autonomy. In 
. 12 Social charges as a proportion of direct labor costs are higher in France 
than any other country in western Europe, with the exception of Italy. lnstitut 
National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, Etudes et Conjuncture, 
No.8, August, 1957, p. 879. 
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a legal sense all of the Caisses, or funds, with the exception of the 
National Social Security Fund (Caisse Nationale de Securite Sociale) 
have the status of private organizations. They are administered by 
elected boards representing both the employees and the employers.13 
The essential function of the Caisses is the collection of contribu-
tions and the disbursement of benefits for the component parts of 
the social security system. 
The Caisses form two parallel systems, one of which is devoted 
to social insurance proper and insurance for industrial injuries and 
occupational disease, and the other to family allowances. These 
two fund systems are linked at the national level by the above-noted 
National Social Security Fund. The social insurance proper system 
consists of, first, 122 local funds (Caisses primaires de Securite 
Sociale), which collect all contributions for social insurance proper 
and industrial accidents or occupational disease, and administer all 
benefits for sickness, maternity, and death, and medical benefits for 
temporary incapacity due to industrial injury or occupational dis-
ease; and, second, of 32 regional funds (Caisse regionale de 
Securite Sociale), which have responsibility for payment of all 
old-age pensions and pensions for permanent disability resulting 
from industrial injury or occupational disease. Family allowances 
are administered through a system of 114 funds (Caisses d'alloca-
tions tamiliales), which have responsibility for the collection of all 
family allowance contributions, and the payment of family benefits 
of all kinds to eligible persons. The National Social Security Fund 
has as its main function the allocation of funds among the various 
social security and family allowance Caisses so as to insure a 
geographical balance of receipts and expenditures. 
This formal administrative apparatus is supplemented by the 
existence of two unions or federations that function on the national 
level as spokesmen for the local or autonomous funds of the system. 
There is the National Federation of Social Security Organizations 
(La Federation Nationale des Organismes de Securite Sociale) , 
representing the local and regional Caisses, and the National Union 
of Family Allowances (L'Union Nationale des Caisses d'Allocations 
Familiales), representing the family allowance funds of the system. 
,. The local funds for social security proper are administered by a board, of 
which three-fourths the membership represents employees and one-fourth em-
ployers. The boards that administer family allow:.nces are composed of one-half 
representatives of employees, one-fourth representatives of employers, and one-
fourth representatives of the self-employed. 
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These federations are without official or legal status within the 
system, but they participate fully in the formulation of public 
policy in social security matters as representatives of the multitude 
of local funds that are of key importance in the operation of the 
system. 
In summary, the administration of France's complex social 
security system is a three-way affair. Over-all control and direction 
rests with the central government through the office of the Director 
General of Social Security in the Ministry of Social Affairs, and the 
16 regional directorates, but a high degree of decentralization and 
local control in actual administration of contributions and benefits 
is achieved by the system of autonomous Caisses or funds. The 
managers of the local funds have a voice in policy formulation at 
the national level through the machinery of the social security 
federations. 
THE SPECIAL REGIMES AND OTHER FORMS OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE 
In addition to the general system, as described in the preceding 
pages, there are more than 20 special schemes or regimes that pro-
vide social security benefits, but which are limited to wage-earners 
in a particular occupation or industry. About 30 percent of French 
wage-earners derive their social security benefits from these special 
schemes, the most important of which are those for workers in 
agriculture, electricity and gas, and the nationalized railroads and 
mines, civil servants (including military personnel), and the self-
employed. The rest of the special schemes are of minor importance. 
The proportion of wage-earners covered by the general system and 
the major special schemes is shown in Table III below. 
TABLE III 
Proportion of Wage-Earners Covered by Different 
Social Security Regimes 
Regime Percent of Wage· Earners 
General System 
Agricultural Regime 
















Source: La Documentation Francaise. Les Institutions Sociales de la France. 1955. 
The French Social Security System I 35 
The special schemes differ from the general system in a number 
of respects. For one thing. administrative control is frequently 
centered in the ministry appropriate to the industry of which the 
scheme is a part. rather than in the office of the General Director 
of Social Security. Thus, for example. the Ministry of Agriculture 
controls the schemes for workers in agriculture; the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce the scheme for the nationalized mines; and 
the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation the scheme for 
railroad workers. 
Second, there is no uniformity among the special schemes with 
respect to the techniques employed to finance the benefits. In 
general, workers and employers in the special schemes contribute to 
their financing, but frequently to a lesser extent than is the case 
with the general system. The special schemes, in some instances, 
draw much more heavily on either the resources of the state or the 
industry concerned for provision of benefits. Table IV compares 
the origin of financial resources for the general system and some of 
the more important special schemes. It may be noted in the table 
that, in some instances, the rate at which the worker's salary is 
taxed is higher in the special schemes than in the general scheme, 
but frequently this higher rate applies to fewer benefits, while the 
remaining benefits are financed by the state or industry concerned. 
Third, there are important differences between the general and 
special schemes with respect to the value of benefits available to 
the participants. In the special schemes, for example, participants 
are usually eligible for retirement benefits at an earlier age than 
contributors to the general system, and, too, the amounts received 
in the form of a pension are generally higher. 
Finally, members of some of the special schemes depend upon 
the general system for certain benefits, while the other special 
schemes have no ties at all with the general system. In particular, 
civil servants receive benefits in kind for illness through the general 
system, while employees of the nationalized French electrical and 
gas companies have benefits in kind for both illness and industrial 
accidents provided by the general system. Students in institutions 
of higher learning are eligible for benefits in kind for illness and 
maternity, as well as family allowances, through the general system, 
although these benefits are financed by subsidy from the central 
government. 
Particular mention should be made of the schemes for agricul-
ture and the self-employed. In the agricultural sector there is a 
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Type of Benefit 








Origin of Financial Resources for Different 
Social Security Regimes 
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Source: La Documentation Fran~se, Les Institutions Sociales de la France, 1955. 
Explanatory note: In the table, financial resources obtained from employees are indi-
cated by I; those obtained from business enterprises (public and private) by E; and 
those obtained directly from the state (i.e., subsidies) by S. When a percentage figure 
i. given, it indicates the tax rate for social security contributions applied against the 
wage or salary. If a percentage is given, followed by an E or S without a percentage 
figure, it indicates the enterprise or state simply contributes an amount to make tip 
any deficit, if the latter exists. When several percentage figures are repeated it simply 
means that this particular contribution is used to finance several different benefits. 
special regime that provides family allowances and the benefits of 
social insurance proper for all wage-earners and salaried employees, 
including the employees of professional organizations and agricul-
tural cooperatives. Social insurance proper is financed by contri-
butions from both farm owners and/or operators and employees, 
while family allowances are financed by a tax on the farm owner 
and/or operator and subsidies from the government. The latter, 
in recent years, have been the most important source of finance for 
family allowances in the agricultural sector,14 Industrial injuries 
for workers in agriculture are covered either by private insurance 
or insurance through an agricultural cooperative, but in either case 
some form of insurance is compulsory. Farm owners and/or opera-
tors, like the self-employed in other sectors of the economy, are not 
covered by social insurance proper, except for old-age pensions, 
but are eligible for family allowances. Since 1952 there has been 
in effect a compulsory system for old-age pensions, to which the 
H Ministere des Finances, Statistiques et Etudes Financieres, No. 99, March, 
1957, pp. 282-285. 
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farm owner and/or operator contributes on a scale that varies with 
his income.ll; Self-employed persons in agriculture may be insured 
on a voluntary basis for illness and maternity. 
The self-employed in other sectors of the economy have suc-
cessfully resisted all efforts to have them included in the general 
system of social security,I6 and, except for an old-age pension 
scheme, instituted in 1948, they benefit only from the system of 
family allowances. Pensions for the self-employed are administered 
through autonomous organizations created for each of the following 
groups: artisans, which includes all persons following a recognized 
handicraft trade; self-employed in industry and commerce; and 
self-employed in the liberal professions. 
The self-employed in each of these categories pay an annual tax 
for financing the old-age pension system, but the amount of the 
tax varies considerably both within and as between these categories. 
For artisans the tax is fixed by decree at an amount equal to a 
certain number of hours of work, each hour of work being estab-
lished as a value equal to a certain percent of the minimum allow-
ance for retired workers. Recently it has been about 15,000 francs 
($36) per year.17 For the self-employed in industry and commerce 
there are six tax categories, each of which is related to a given pen-
sion sum. The insured can, within the limits of these categories, 
choose freely the amount he wishes to contribute each year toward 
an eventual pension. These amounts range from 12,000 francs ($28) 
to 48,000 francs ($112) per year.18 For members of the liberal pro-
fessions the annual tax is fixed periodically for each profession on 
the basis of estimates of the average annual income for the latter. 
In 1954 the tax varies from 3,000 francs ($7) to 20,000 francs ($47) 
per year.19 
Self-employed persons in each of these categories are eligible at 
the age of 65 (60 when disabled) for a basic pension of 32,000 francs 
($76) per year, providing their annual income from all sources is 
less than 194,000 francs ($461) if single, or 244,000 francs ($580) if 
15 Law of July 10, 1952. 
16 A major reason for this is the unwillingness of the self·employed to submit 
to the government accurate information on their incomes, as would be required 
if they participated fullv in the system. 
17 La Documentation Fran~aise, Les Institutions Sociales de Ie France, Paris, 
1955, Vol. l. p. 225. 
to Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
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married. Beyond this, the actual pension received is a function of 
the total contributions made by the insured prior to retirement. 
OTHER WELFARE EXPENDITURES 
The welfare expenditures described in the foregoing sections 
of this chapter are all made within the framework of France's social 
security system, either as a part of the general system or one of the 
special schemes. In addition to these expenditures by the social 
security organizations, there are several other types of expenditures 
for welfare purposes that continue to loom large in the budget of 
the central government. These include unemployment compensa· 
tion, traditional assistance, and aid to the victims of war. Before 
we conclude this chapter, a brief word about each of these is in 
order. 
In France benefits for loss of work are paid for both total and 
partial unemployment. The benefits are administered and paid 
by the local community after authorization from the Ministry of 
Labor. The system is a noncontributory one, as it is financed 
jointly by the central government and the local community. The 
financial participation of the latter varies between 5 to 20 per-
cent of the total outlay. For workers totally unemployed the rate 
of compensation is between 225 to 330 francs per day for heads 
of households, and 100 to 130 francs per day for all others. A 
worker may receive compensation for partial unemployment re-
sulting from a temporary shutdown at his place of employment 
or for a reduction in the work week below the legal maximum, pro-
viding that full unemployment in the establishment has reached 
at least 20 percent of the normal work force. The hourly compen-
sation for partial unemployment is 1/80 of the total compensation 
the worker would receive in a 14-day period if wholly unemployed. 
Traditional assistance includes welfare and charitable e~pendi­
tures for such things as aid to the aged and infirm, medical care 
for the insane, grants to tubercular persons, and aid to children. 
In general, such assistance is directed to persons who, for one 
reason or another, are not eligible for benefits or assistance under 
the social security programs. Since the war a new form of assistance, 
aid to the "economically weak," has appeared. This is for people 
with low, fixed incomes who have suffered from the postwar de-
preciation of the franc. They receive free medical care, reduced 
fares for public transportation, and have access to low-cost meals 
in restaurants especially organized for their benefit. 
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Finally, there are a variety of forms of assistance to war victims 
and their dependents. These include not only pensions, but such 
things as medical care, homes for the aged and disabled, financial 
aid for vocational retraining, scholarships, and the care of war 
orphans. There are more than twenty different categories of war 
victims eligible for some form of aid. 
3 / Transfer Expenditures in the French Economy 
I N THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER we discussed in detail the organization of France's social security system; in this chapter we shall be concerned with the over-all importance of expenditures for wel-
fare purposes in the economy. 
There are two major facets to an analysis of the economic sig-
nificance of welfare expenditures. First, it is necessary to determine 
what portion of the nation's income is being utilized in this way, 
for only if this is done will it be possible to reach a judgement about 
the "real" costs of the welfare state. And, second, it is essential to 
measure-insofar as this is possible-the effect of welfare expendi-
tures upon the distribution of income. The latter is required be-
cause one professed objective of the welfare state is an alteration 
in the distribution of income. In this chapter we will examine wel-
fare expenditures in France in relation to the national income and 
other aggregates, while in Chapter 4 following will be analyzed 
the effects of these expenditures upon the distribution of income 
in France. In this chapter, too, we shall make a number of com-
parisons between France, on the one hand, and the United Kingdom 
and the United States, on the other, with respect to the magnitude 
and significance of welfare expenditures in the respective economies 
of these countries. 
Before proceeding to the analysis proper, it may be useful to 
recall that, generally speaking, expenditures for welfare purposes 
have the character of transfers, i.e., they transfer income (real and 
monetary) from one group in the economy to another. In Chapter 
I transfer expenditures were defined as outlays for which the state 
receives no equivalent value in goods or services in exchange. It 
may also be recalled that transfer expenditures, while they do not 
involve the use of real resources by the government, do reflect, by 
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and large, the use of government power as an instrument for the 
redistribution of income. Thus the magnitude of these expendi-
tures in relation to such aggregates as the national income, personal 
income, total government expenditures, etc., serves not only as a 
measure of the extent to which a country has become a welfare 
state, but also provides a way to measure the real cost to the 
economy of welfare activities. In a simple and direct sense the pro-
portion of the national income-i.e., income earned in the process 
of production-transferred from group to group through the in-
strumentality of the government measures both the degree of "wel-
fare statism" and the real cost of the latter to the economy. 
NATIONAL INCOME IN FRANCE 
We shall begin the analysis by an examination of data on the 
national income in France for the prewar year of 1938, and the 
postwar years of 1952-55.1 These data are of interest not only be-
cause they serve to underscore the impact of the welfare state upon 
the origins of income in France, but also because they reveal a 
number of other important structural characteristics of the economy. 
The latter, as will be shown, have an important bearing upon the 
particular forms that the welfare state apparatus has assumed in 
France. 
Table V shows (in percent) the factor or functional origin of 
the national income. The most important change from prewar has 
to do with the share of labor income in the total. As compared to 
1938, the labor cost of the national output has risen from 51.7 per-
cent to 58.4 percent in 1955, a relative gain of about 13 percent. 
But this relatively larger share of labor income in the national in-
come total has not resulted in a corresponding increase in the 
proportion of the national income actually received by workers in 
the form of money wages. In fact, the proportionate share of direct 
money outlays for wages and salaries declined from 48.5 percent 
in 1938 to 46.8 percent in 1955. Thus, the gain experienced by 
French wage-earners in the postwar era wth respect to labor's share 
of the national income has come about primarily because of a 
growth in "social wages"-i.e., social security benefits-rather than 
1 The data in all the tables in this chapter are in percent, as the major pur-
pose of the tables is to permit comparisons. These percentage data are derived 
from the tables in the appendix, which present the data in absolute amount. 
Comments on the major sources for statistical data in France are also found 
in the appendix. 
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money wages. The social security system has had the effect, in other 
words, of boosting the share of labor income in the national in-
come total, but in an indirect fashion. This is also reflected in the 
increase of social security taxes (on business firms) from 3.2 per-
cent of the national income in 1938 to 9.3 per cent in 1955. 
Several other observations of importance may be drawn from 
the data in the table. For one thing, it is evident that France's 
economy is still characterized by the existence of large numbers of 
small and medium-sized enterprises. This is reflected in the fact 
that in 1955, 31.3 percent of the national income still originated 
in the activities of unincorporated enterprises, which are, for the 
most part, small.2 France, in other words, is considerably less in-
dustrialized than either the United States or the United Kingdom 
(see Table IX). In one sense, this means France is less able to 
"afford" an extensive system of welfare expenditures because, in 
general, real income is a function of the degree of industrializa-
tion attained by a nation. This, in conjunction with the difficulties 
involved in collecting taxes from many thousands of small business 
enterprises, helps explain the preponderant role that indirect taxes 
play in France in the financing of both social security and govern-
ment expenditures in general. The decline in the share of the 
national income originating with unincorporated enterprise is a 
consequence, in all probability, of the impact of the modernization 
plans on the economy.s The only other change of significance to 
be noted here is the virtual disappearance of interest as a source 
of income. This is a result of the postwar inflation. 
The data on personal income and outlay (Table VI) show more 
clearly than do the national income data the impact of the welfare 
state on the origins of income in France. These data pertain to 
money income actually received rather than income earned in the 
process of production. The big change to be noted here is the 
large increase in transfer payments as a source of personal income 
• In 1950, for example, 69.5 percent of all industrial establishments in France 
had less than five employees. See Ministere des Finances, Statistiques et Etudes 
Financieres, No. 18, 1953, p. 220. 
• France's first modernization plan, the Monnet Plan, was put into effect in 
1947 and terminated in 1952. The second modernization plan, drafted during 
1953, covered the period 1954-57, and the third, for the period 1958-61, is now 
in effect. For an evaluation of the impact of planning on France's economic 
structure, see the writer's paper, "National Product and Structural Change in 
the French Economy," The American Journal ot Economics and Sociology, April, 
1957, pp. 251-280. 
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TABLE V 
National Income in France: 1938, 1952-55 
(in percent) 
Origin of National Income 1938 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Wages and Salaries 
48.5 45.8 46.7 46.9 Wages and Salaries 46.8 
Supplements 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.3 
Social Security Taxes 3.2 8.8 9.1 9.4 9.3 
Total Labor Income 51.7 57.0 58.3' 58.7 58.4 
Unincorporated Enterprise 36.8 33.2 31.9 31.3 31.3 
Net Interest 2.2 - OJ - 0.2 - 0.2 - 0.3 
Corporate Income 0.3 9.9 10.0 10.2 10.6 
National Income 100.0 100.0 100.0 "100.0 100.0 
and, at the same time, the relative decline in the importance of 
factor income in the total picture. In 1935, 90_5 percent of personal 
income in France was derived directly from participation in the 
productive process, while only 9.5 percent originated from transfer 
payments. By 1955, however, the proportion of personal income 
derived from transfer payments had risen to 19.3 percent, and the 
share of factor income in the total had declined to SO.7 percent. 
The data also show there has been a shift in the character of trans-
fers, as income in the form of social security benefits amounted to 
14.S percent of the total in 1955, in contrast to only 5.0 percent 
in 1935. Transfers in the form of traditional assistance payments 
have declined in relative importance. This reflects the fact that 
the expanded social security system has increasingly tended to 
supplant the older and more traditional forms of assistance. 
These data on personal income and its disposition also confirm 
what was said previously about changes in the relative importance 
of the major sources of income in the economy. Direct wage and 
salary payments account for about the same proportion of the 
personal income total as they did before the war, while income 
derived from the activities of small business (unincorporated en-
terprise) and interest payments have declined in relative importance. 
These changes reflect both a decline in the importance of small-
scale enterprise in an absolute sense, and the increasing significance 
of transfer payments as a source of personal income for all groups 
in the economy. As already pointed out, the decline in the relative 
importance of interest income is simply a by-product of inflation. 
The data on the disposition of personal income do not show any 
startling changes from the prewar pattern, except perhaps in the 
matter of taxation. Consumption expenditures and personal savings 
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absorb about the same share of the total as in 1938, but there has 
been a slight change in the tax figures. The proportion of personal 
income going for social security taxes has risen from 0.9 percent 
of the total to 2.9 percent in 1955, a development not unexpected in 
view of the postwar expansion of the social security system. The 
relative decline in the proportion of personal income paid out in 
direct-i.e., income-taxes is less easily explained, although it prob-
ably reflects the above-mentioned decline in the relative importance 
of individual enterprise income in the economy, and the strong 
propensity for tax evasion found among the small shopkeepers and 
artisans.4 
The tax picture, though, is of particular significance for another 
reason. The latter has to do with the relationship between the con-
tributions of individuals to the support of the social security system 
and the cash benefits that individuals receive from the system. Here 
the picture is particularly interesting, for individuals in the aggre-
gate pay far less in the way of taxes to support the system than 
what they draw from the system in the way of benefits. In 1955, for 
example, individuals received 19.3 percent of their personal in-
come in the form of various social benefits, but paid out in taxes 
only 2.9 percent of their incomes for the direct support of the 
system. This relationship stresses again what was said earlier about 
the indirect character of the system's financial support. It also helps 
explain why in France there is so little awareness of the real costs 
to the economy of the social security system.5 
It is true that the situation would appear in a more favorable 
light if the data were rearranged to include social security taxes 
levied against the employer as a part of personal income and then 
include these same taxes in the total of social security contributions 
by individuals. 1£ this was done with the data for 1952, social bene-
fits would then total 16.1 percent of total income, and social 
• According to a Ministry of Finance survey, in the agricultural sector nearly 
80 percent of the taxable income is not reported to the tax authorities, while in 
commerce and trade the corresponding figure is 28 percent. For the industrial 
sector the percentage of fraud in tax returns was estimated to be about 20. See 
Ministere des Finances, op. cit., pp. 202, 203. The data in Chapter 4 following 
lend additional statistical support to the view that tax evasion is widespread 
among the self-employed and farmers. 
• During the writer's stay in France this point frequently arose in personal 
conversations. In general, the ordinary French citizen approves of the social 
security system and its benefits, but he sees little relationship between these ex-
penditures ar.d the prevailing high level of prices in the economy. 
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security tax contributions by individuals 9.7 percent of personal 
income. A case could be made for this procedure, particularly for 
France, because "social wages" do loom large in the personal in-
come position of the average citizen. But at best it is not a strong 
case. Realism demands that personal income be computed on the 
basis of money income actually received by persons, and thus it is 
neither reasonable nor desirable to include in this total employer 
contributions to social security, even though these outlays eventual-
ly appear as one form of personal income received. The objective 
here is to show the sharp postwar increase in social benefits as a 
source of personal income, and this objective would be distorted 
if the above procedure was followed. Moreover, from the point of 
view of assessing the real cost and incidence of the social security 
system in the economy, it would clearly be a mistake to treat em-
ployer social security contributions as a direct tax, the incidence 
of which is on the employee. Realism requires that these taxes be 
treated as a part of the employer's total labor costs, which are, 
sooner or later, reflected in the final price of goods and services 
sold. 
TABLE VI 
Personal Income and Outlay in France: 1938, 1952-55 
(in percent) 
Sources of Personal Income 1938 1952 1953 1954 
Wages and Saf!ries 45.6 45.3 45.9 45.9 
Unincorporated Enterprise 34.6 31.4 30.2 29.2 
Interest 6.9 1.0 0.8 1.0 
Dividends 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 
Abroad (net) 1.0 0.8 0.8 
Total Factor Income 90.5 82.1 81.2 80.4 
Transfer Income 
Social Securi ty 5.0 11.2 11.9 12.7 
Supplements 2.4 2.4 2.4 
Assistance 4.5 2.9 3.2 3.1 
'Var Damages 1.4 1.3 1.4 
-- --
Total Transfer Income 9.5 17.9 18.8 19.6 
Personal Income 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Personal Outlay 
Consumption 86.8 87.0 87.6 86.4 
Taxes 
Income 4.2 2.3 2.9 2.6 
Social Secu ri ty 0.6 2.6 2.9 2.9 
--
Total 4.8 4.9 5.8 5.5 
Savings 8.4 8.1 6.6 8.1 























46 / The Welfare State in hance 
Our conclusion at this point is simply that there is, in the 
aggregate, little relationship between what the French citizen pays 
directly in taxes to support the social security system, and what he 
receives from the same system in the form of cash benefits that 
augment his personal income. In theory, the French system, as was 
pointed out in Chapter 2, is wholly self-financed, either by con-
tributions from the beneficiaries or by contributions from the em-
ployer. In practice, though, such is hardly the case because of the 
small proportion of direct money benefits that are financed by direct 
taxation. The actual pattern is one of dependence on indirect 
taxation, with a consequent diffusion of the real costs of the system 
throughout the economy via the price mechanism. Under such 
circumstances there may be a considerable unplanned transfer of 
real income between social groups in the economy, although the 
magnitude of the latter is not easily measured. If the above is true, 
it also follows that there is no assurance that the system is necessarily 
progessive with respect to both the incidence of its costs and benefits. 
SOCIAL EXPENDITURE IN THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS 
The place that social security or welfare expenditures occupy in 
France's economic structure can be viewed from another perspective 
if we examine the aggregate of such expenditures in relation to the 
expenditure total of the government for its current operations and 
also the major tax sources for the latter's revenue. This is done in 
Tables VII and VIII, which show (in percent)·the current ex-
penditures of the government (including local government) for 
1938 and the period 1952-55, and the major source of tax revenue 
for the same years. These data are also useful because they provide 
additional insight into important structural characteristics of the 
economy. 
In Table VII government expenditures are presented in four 
major categories. These are: government consumption, or purchase 
of goods and services; net interest; transfer payments to individuals; 
and transfer payments to business firms. These four categories 
represent the total of French government expenditures for current 
operations, but they do not include certain other outlays that have 
a prominent place in the budget of the central government. These 
latter include, first, capital expenditures by the government, which, 
in French national income accounting, are included in the figure 
for gross domestic investment; and, second, lending operations by 
the central government vis-a-vis both the private and public sectors 
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of the economy.6 There is considerable logic in the French practice 
of treating capital expenditures by the government as a part of 
gross domestic investment-this may be contrasted to the U. S. 
procedure of treating these outlays as part of current government 
expenditure-and in the analysis which follows, this distinction be-
tween current and capital operations by the government has been 
retained. The validity of this distinction lies in the fact that it 
enables us to obtain a clear picture of the current operations of 
the government, as respects both transfers and the public consump-
tion of goods and services. This, then, enables us to see clearly 
what proportion of both income earned in production-i.e., the 
national income-and the total real output is being utilized for 
the activities of the government. The reader is warned, however, 
that it is not possible to obtain a satisfactory idea of the over-all 
financial position of the French government from the accounts for 
the latter's current operations.7 This is because tp.e aforementioned 
capital and lending operations are not included in the current 
account for the government sector. 
In Table VII the postwar growth of the welfare state is re-
flected in the shift in the relative position occupied by govern-
ment consumption and transfer expenditures in the over-all total 
of current government outlays. Since 1938 government expendi-
tures devoted to the purchase of goods and services for the more 
or les!) traditional governmental functions have declined from 48.3 
percent of the total to 44.5 percent in 1955. Correspondingly, the 
share of transfer expenditures in the total rose from 51.7 percent 
in 1938 to 55.5 percent in 1955. The data for the period 1952-55 
show that a trend in this direction has continued to manifest itself 
in the postwar economy, for in these years the share of government 
consumption in the total continued to decline, while tranfers rose 
accordingly. Thus, tranfer activities have tended to absorb an in-
creasingly larger proportion of the government's resources being 
devoted to current operations. Whether or not this trend will 
continue in the future cannot be determined for certain, but the 
probabilities are in favor of its continuation simply because the 
• During the period 1947-52, for example, 45 percent of investment expendi. 
ture (private and public) carried out in accordance with the objectives of the 
modernization plan was financed by the central government. 
7 During the period 1952-55 the deficit for the central government finances 
averaged about 650 billion francs per year. This is roughly the equivalent of 
$1.5 billion per year. 
48 / The Welfare State in France 
full economic effects of France's welfare state will not be felt until 
about 1970. In Chapter 2 it was pointed out that the old-age pen-
sion system will not become fully effective until around 1970, and 
this, in conjunction with continued pressure for improved benefits, 
will undoubtedly increase the proportion of government outlays 
devoted to welfare purposes.s Whether or not the French state can 
manage this without drastic financial reform and in view of its 
commitments to the European common market is problematical. 
The impact of the welfare state on the structure of French 
government expenditures is better seen if we examine the three 
major categories of tranfer expenditures. The increase in aggregate 
transfers from 51.7 percent of total outlays in 1938 to 55.5 percent 
in 1955 does not tell the whole story because of the rather drastic 
shift in the composition of these tranfers. In 1938, for example, 
interest on the public debt was a major transfer item, as it accounted 
for 15 percent of all government outlays. But by 1955 this item 
had become of relatively little significance, for then it represented 
only 2.9 percent of total government expenditure. The postwar 
inflation is, of course, the major explanation for this shift. The 
effects of the social security system are seen most clearly in the data 
pertaining to transfers to individuals. Outlays for social security 
rose from 15.0 percent of the total in 1938 to 30.2 percent in 1955, 
a relative increase of about 100 percent. At the same time ex-
penditures for traditional assistance declined from 14.2 percent 
of total outlays in 1938 to 7.8 percent in 1955. War-damage in-
demnities, an item that did not exist in 1938, account for the 
balance of the increase in transfers to individuals. The balance 
sheet for all these items shows an increase in welfare transfers to 
individuals from 30.0 percent of total government expenditures in 
1938 to 41.4 percent in 1955. 
The idea implicit in the above comments that the welfare state 
is, in the main, responsible for the relative increase in transfer ex-
penditures in the government account is supported by the data 
pertaining to transfers to business firms. In general, there has not 
. been any significant increase in subsidies to business since 1938. 
True, the total of transfers to business has risen from 6.7 percent 
SIn connection with this it should be noted that a complete integration of 
the approximately nine million Moslems in Algeria into the economic and social 
structure of Metropolitan France would impose a new and staggering transfer 
burden on France's social security system. 
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of government outlays in 1938 to 11.2 percent in 1955, but this 
gain is largely accounted for by payments of war-damage indemni-
ties, again an item that did not exist before the war. The total of 
subsidies to business rose only slightly, from 8.3 percent in 1938 
to 9.5 percent in 1955. 
In sum, then, the postwar expansion of the social security system 
has brought about significant changes in the structure of current 
government expenditures in France. There has been an appreciable 
increase in the proportion of the government's resources devoted 
to welfare payments to individuals, and a relative decline in the 
proportion of resources being devoted to the state's traditional 
functions, as well as in transfers to individuals in the form of in-
terest on the public debt. Transfers to business firms have under-
gone only minor modifications. 
TABLE VII 
Government Expenditures in France: 1938, 1952-55 
(in percent) 
1938 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Government Consumption 
Goods and Services 29.2 20.6 20.1 18.4 16.6 
'Vages and Salaries 19.1 29.5 29.2 28.4 27.9 
Total Consumption 48.3 50.1 49.3 . 46.8 44.5 
Net Interest 15.0 2.7 2.3 2.7 2.9 
Transfers to Individuals 
Social Securi ty 15.8 26.6 27.3 29.6 30.2 
Assistance 14.2 7.0 7.2 7.3 7.8 
War Damages 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.4 
Total to Individuals 30.0 36.9 37.6 40.0 41.4 
Transfers to Business 
Subsidies 8.3 7.4 8.6 8.8 9.5 
War Damages 
Less: Current surplus of 
3.2 2.7 2.3 2.3 
Government enterprise 
- 1.6 - 0.3 - 0.5 
- 0.6 - 0.6 
Total to Business f0 IO:3 10.8 10.5 11.2 
Total Transfers 51.7 49.9 50.7 53.2 55.5 
Total Expenditures 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Data on the sources of tax revenue for the public sector are 
contained in Table VIII. In this table the data are arranged in two 
different ways so as to bring out as clearly as possible the more 
significant characteristics of France's tax structure. In the first part 
of the table taxes are grouped according to the conventional cate-
gories of direct taxes, indirect business taxes, and social security 
\ taxes. But in the second part the data are rearranged so as to 
classify the taxes on the basis of their presumed incidence. That is, 
they are grouped according to whether the tax is borne directly 
50 / The Welfare State in France 
by individuals, indirectly by individuals through higher prices for 
consumption goods and services, or by business firms. Analysis of 
the tax data in these two ways permits us to distinguish readily the 
impact of the welfare state on France's revenue system. 
The most striking characteristic of France's tax structure is the 
extent to which the state is dependent upon indirect taxation for 
its revenues. In 1955, for example, indirect business taxes accounted 
for 54.8 percent of the government's tax revenue. If we add to this 
figure the social security contributions of the business firm-which 
are, as is argued in this study, another form of indirect taxation-
the amount then becomes 76.8 percent of the total tax revenue. 
The converse of this, of course, is the relatively insignificant role 
played by direct taxation. Again in 1955 the personal income tax 
was responsible for only 6.2 percent of the government's revenue. 
The total of income taxes on both individuals and business firms 
yielded but 15.9 percent of total tax income, and even if we add 
to this the social security taxes paid by individuals the total be-
comes only 23.2 percent. 
Since 1938 the tax structure has undergone certain modifications, 
TABLE VIII 
Revenue from Taxation in France: 1938, 1952-55 
(in percent) 
1938 1952 1953 1954 1950 
Part 1 
Direct Taxes 
Individuals 19.7 6.2 6.9 6.5 6.2 
Firms 4.9 9.7 10.7 9.7 9.7 
Total Direct Taxes 24.6 15.9 17.6 16.2 15.9 
Indirect Business Taxes 60.5 56.4 54.9 55.3 54.8 
Social Security Taxes 
Individuals 2.6 6.5 7.1 7.1 7.3 
Firms 12.3 21.2 20.4 21.4 22.0 
Total Social 
Security Taxes 14.9 27.7 27.5 28.5 29.3 
Total Tax Revenue 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Part 11 
Taxes on Individuals 
Income 19.7 6.2 6.9 6.5 6.2 
Social Securi ty 2.6 6.5 7.1 7.1 7.3 
Total Taxes on 
Individuals 22.3 12.7 14.0 13.6 13.5 
Taxes on Consumption 
Indirect Business Taxes 60.5 56.4 54.9 55.3 54.8 
Social Security (Firms) 12.3 21.2 20.4 21.4 22.0 
Total Taxes on 
Consumption 72.8 77.6 75.3 76.7 76.8 
Taxes on Business 4.9 9.7 10.7 9.7 9.7 
Total Tax Revenue 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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primarily as a result of the expansion of the social security system. 
In Part I of Table VIII it can be seen that both direct taxes (income 
taxes on individuals and firms) and indirect business taxes have de-
clined in relative importance as a source of tax revenue. In 1955 
direct taxes accounted for 15.9 percent of all tax revenues as 
against 24.6 percent in 1938, while indirect business taxes totaled 
54.8 percent of revenue in 1955 as contrasted to 60.5 percent in 
1938. This shift in the relative importance of these two tax cate-
gories is due to the increased importance of social security taxation, 
both for firms and for individuals. In 1955 social security taxes ac-
counted for 29.3 percent of all government tax revenue as com-
pared to 14.9 percent in 1938, a relative change of about 96 percent. 
Social security taxes levied against business firms rose from 12.3 
percent of revenue to 22.0 percent between 1938 and 1955, while 
the contributions of individuals increased from 2.6 percent to 7.3 
percent in the same period. Thus, the enlarged emphasis upon 
welfare expenditures in France's postwar economy has made social 
security taxes more important than income taxes as a revenue 
source. This is a reversal of the prewar situation. The other change 
of importance from the prewar situation to be noted is the larger 
role assumed by the taxation of the income of business firms. In 
1955 such taxes were 9.7 percent of the total tax revenue, and only 
4.9 percent in 1938. This is a consequence of the introduction of 
a corporation income tax in 1948. It probably reflects, too, the more 
industrialized status of France's economy in 1955 as compared to 
prewar. The modernization plans have accelerated somewhat the 
trend toward larger establishments. 
The extent to which France's revenue system is geared to in-
direct taxation results from the combination of a number of cir-
cumstances. It derives fundamentally from the well-known aver-
sion of the French for direct taxation. In its worst form this leads 
to outright tax evasion, a practice long recognized to be widespread 
among the owners of small enterprises. This hostility to direct taxa-
tion in combination with the exceedingly heavy financial commit-
ments of postwar governments for reconstruction and moderniza-
tion has forced the state to rely increasingly on indirect taxation. 
To these things has been added the heavy burden of welfare ex-
penditures that require the state to transfer a large portion of the 
national income from group to group. Under these circumstances 
it is doubtful if any government, let alone the relatively feeble 
regime of France's Fourth Republic, could impose on its citizens 
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direct taxes in the amount necessary to meet such a burden of 
commitments. Of course the real costs are there, irrespective of 
the system of finance, but indirect taxation has the dubious virtue 
of concealing these real costs from the great majority of citizens. 
The data already presented pertaining to the public finances of 
France, as well as data to be presented later in this chapter pertain-
ing to welfare expenditures in the United Kingdom, lead the writer 
to offer the following observations with respect to both the real 
costs and the techniques of financing the welfare state. There can 
be little doubt that the modern welfare state imposes a relatively 
heavy burden of transfer expenditures on the central authority. 
Granted this, and in view of the increasingly heavy commitments of 
modern governments in other areas, it is submitted that it is 
illusionary to believe that these outlays can be wholly financed by 
direct taxation. In the early formulation of the welfare state con-
cept, particularly in the United Kingdom, the idea existed that it 
would involve essentially taking from the "classes" and giving to the 
"masses." This simplified view of the way in which the welfare 
state can be financed is, in the economic sense, an illusion, even 
though politically it remains an idea of considerable potency. This 
is not to be construed as an argument against the expansion of 
welfare activities by the government, for this is a question having 
to do with basic social objectives and values, but it is, in a sense, 
a plea for realism in recognizing some of the economic implications 
of these activities. The thesis advanced here is, essentially, that an 
enlargement of the state's welfare activities via the mechanism of 
transfer expenditures must inevitably, under modern conditions, 
entail a significant increase in indirect taxation with consequent 
price and income effects that cannot be readily determined. France's 
experience supports this view, for the tax burden thrust upon the 
business firm is a major factor in boosting French prices above com-
petitive levels in world markets.9 This, in turn, has aggravated 
France's balance of payments problem. 
TRANSFER EXPENDITURES AND TAXATION IN THE ECONOMIES OF 
FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES 
In the foregoing sections of this chapter we analyzed welfare 
expenditures in France in relation to the national income, personal 
• The noncompetitive character of French prices in world markets is well 
documented in the so-called Nathan report. See Commission pour l'etude des 
disparites entre les prix franl,;ais et etrangers, Rapp01"t General, Paris, 1954. 
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income, government expenditure, and taxation. In this section 
comparisons will be made between France, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States with respect to both the magnitude of welfare 
expenditures and the uses of national product in the respective 
economies of all three countries. The purpose of these comparisons 
is, first, to underscore structural difference between the economy of 
France, on the one hand, and the economies of Britain and the 
United States, on the other; and, second, to measure the relative 
significance of welfare expenditures in the economies of each of 
these countries.1° This study is concerned primarily with the wel-
fare state in France, but comparisons along the lines indicated 
above will contribute to an understanding of the way in which the 
welfare state functions within the French economy. 
TABLE IX 
Gross National Product and Expenditure in 
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States: 1952 
(in percent) 
France United Kingdom United States 
Sources of GNP 
Personal Consumption 
Gross Domestic Investment 
Government Consumption 
Net Foreign Investment 
Gross National Product 




Other Property Income 
National Income 
Indirect Business Taxes 
Business Transfer Payments 
Statistical Discrepancy 
Less: Subsidies Minus Current 
Surplus of Government Enterprise 
Net NatIOnal Product 
Capital Consumption Allowances 














































10 The data for 1952 are used as the basis for comparison between the three 
countries primarily because 1952 is the most recent year for which accurate data 
are available on the internal distribution of income in France (see Chapter 4). 
It was also a year relatively free of strong inflationary pressures in all the coun-
tries concerned. Actually it does not matter a great deal whether the comparison 
is made on the basis of the data for 1952 or a subsequent year, because postwar 
welfare institutions had largely become stabilized by 1952, and have not under-
gone any significant changes in France, Britain, or the United States since that 
lime. 
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Table IX contains data (in percent) on the origins and dis-
position of the gross national productll in France, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. With respect to the sources of 
the GNP-i.e., the major categories of expenditure in the economy 
-there are no extremely important differences in the economies of 
these countries. In France, gross domestic investment is somewhat 
higher than in either Britain or the United States, but government 
consumption is slightly lower. Actually, the proportion of total 
output being directed to both government consumption and gross 
investment is about the same in all three countries. The point in 
this is that public activity in France does not absorb a greater 
proportion of the economy's real output than do similar activities 
in the United Kingdom and the United States. The real "burden" 
of government on the economy is measured by the proportion of 
real output-i.e., GNP-absorbed by the public sector for its pur-
poses. In national income accounting practice this is equal to 
government consumption, or the government's purchase of goods 
and services. It is true, of course, that the "burden" of govern-
ment is particularly heavy in France when viewed from the per-
spective of total government outlays, but this has not come about 
because the government in France attempts to carryon more func-
tions of a kind that utilize real resources than is done in either the 
United Kingdom or the United States. Rather, it has come about 
because of the volume of transfer expenditures that has been thrust 
on the public sector in France.12 
When we turn to the data on the allocation of the GNP, we 
find several interesting differences between the economy of France 
and those of the United Kingdom and the United States. The 
allocations side of the GNP data is important because it constitutes, 
in effect, a measure of the "cost" to the economy of the total out-
put realized in a particular period. The three major categories of 
"cost" that make up the allocations side of the GNP are factor 
11 Hereafter the gross national product will be referred to as GNP. 
12 The re2der may wonder about the treatment of nationalized industry, as 
nationalization is more extensive in both Britain and France than it is in the 
United States. In national income accounting practices. nationali7ed industries 
are considered as a part of the business sector, just as is private enterprise. Hence 
the existence of nationalized industries does not enlarge the role of the public 
sector with respect to the proportion of the economy's resources absorbed by 
the latter f01 its purposes. If nationalized industries are suhsidi7en. hv the state, 
this will appear in the national accounts as transfer e.xpenditures by the govern-
ment, and will differ in no wa), from subsidies to the private sector. 
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costs, or the total of payments made to factor owners to secure the 
services of economic resources for the production period in ques-
tion; indirect business taxes, which are a part of the cost of the 
national output on the assumption that these taxes will be re-
flected in the price of final goods and services; and capital consump-
tion allowances, which reflect the contribution of existing capital 
instruments to current output. An analysis of the allocations side 
of the GNP reveals much meaningful information about the eco-
nomic and industrial structure of a country. 
The point was made earlier in this chapter that France is less 
industrialized than either the United States or the United Kingdom. 
The data in Table IX support this contention, for as a general 
proposition the more industrialized a nation is, the greater will 
be the proportion of the national income (or GNP) allocated to 
labor and corporate income. This simply reflects the fact that the 
process of industrialization brings about a concentration of pro-
duction in larger units, with a consequent growth in the number 
of wage and/or salaried employees and a corresponding decline in 
the importance of self-employment. Thus the cost allocation of 
the national income (or GNP) among the factors of production 
provides us with a set of clues to evaluate the extent of industriali-
zation in a country. 
On the basis of this criterion France is clearly less of an indus-
trial nation than either the United Kingdom or the United States. 
Data in the table show that in France only 43.2 percent of the GNP 
is accounted for by compensation of employees-i.e., wage and 
salary payments-as compared to 67.7 percent in the United King-
dom and 55.5 percent in the United States. On the other hand, 
income accruing to the owners of individual enterprises is pro-
portionally much greater in France than in the other two nations. 
In France income in this form totals 25.2 percent of the GNP in 
contrast to 8.6 and 1l.S percent in Britain and the United States, 
respectively. Corporate income, as one would expect, is of rela-
tively greater importance in the British and American economies. 
What conclusions, then, can be drawn from the data at this 
point? To the extent that France is less an industrial state than 
either Britain or America, it means, in a sense, that France is less 
able to "afford" an extensive system of social security than either 
of the other two countries. Why is this so? It is so, first, because 
in a general way real income per capita is a function of the degree 
of industrialization attained by a nation, and, second, it follows 
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that what a nation can "afford" in the way of social benefits is, 
again in a broad sense, a function of the real income of its people. 
The latter is the case simply because the welfare state requires 
extensive transfers of income, and the extent to which this can 
be done successfully will be limited by the level of real income 
actually existing in a country. A poor country, in other words, 
cannot afford to indulge in income transfers on a large scale simply 
because there will be for the mass of its citizens very little income 
in excess of what is necessary to provide a bare subsistence standard 
of living. France, of course, is not poor in this sense, but since its 
real income is below that of both the United Kingdom and the 
United States,l3 the French economy is in a less favorable position 
to support large outlays for welfare purposes. Once again, this 
is not to be construed as an argument against welfare expenditures 
as such, but simply as recognition of the fact that the level of real 
income is of crucial importance with respect to the means employed 
to finance the welfare state. It is argued here as a general principle 
that the lower the level of real income, the less possible it becomes 
to resort to direct taxation as a means of finance for welfare ex-
penditures. A practical consequence of this is that the beneficiaries. 
of the welfare state will, in all probability, pay indirectly for most 
of its costs through higher prices for the goods and services they 
consume. 
Two other differences between France and the economies of 
Britain and the United States may be noted on the basis of the 
data in Table IX. First, indirect business taxes absorb a larger 
portion of France's GNP than is true in either the United Kingdom 
or the United States. The difference between France and the United 
Kingdom is not especially large, but the contrast between France 
and the United States in this respect is quite significant. This, it 
would seem, supports the thesis already advanced about the in-
evitability of indirect taxation in a welfare state setting, as both 
France and the United Kingdom have gone further in this direction 
than has the United States. Second, capital consumption allowances 
absorb a larger proportion of the GNP in France than in either of 
the other two countries. This is a consequence of the greater aver-
13 In 1955, according to a recent study of the OEEC, the per capita GNP in 
the United States was $2,310, that of the United Kingdom $1,470, and that of 
France $1,255. See Milton Gilbert, Comparative Natiollal Products and Price 
Levels, OEEC, Paris. 1957. 
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age age of industrial plant in France as compared to Britain and 
the United States, and has meant for France a somewhat lower rate 
of net investment, a fact which indirectly affects the country's rate 
of economic growth.14 
The data on personal income and outlay provide additional 
evidence of important structural differences in the economies of 
the three countries. These data are contained in Table X. The 
major difference to be noted here is the much greater importance 
in France of transfer payments as a source of personal income than 
is true for Britain or America. The relative importance of transfer 
payments as a source of personal income is a good measure of the 
degree of "welfare statism" existing in a nation because, in general, 
these payments are transfers made for welfare purposes. On the 
basis of this criterion it can be argued that France is more of a wel-
fare state than either the United Kingdom or the United States. 
In France 17.9 percent of personal income is derived from transfer 
expenditures whereas in the United Kingdom the corresponding 
figure is 7.4 percent, and for the United States it is but 4.7 percent. 
TABLE X 
Personal Income and Outlay in France, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States: 1952 
(in percent) 
France United Kingdom United States 
Sources of Personal Itlcome 
Wages and Salaries 45.3 69.9 68.9 
Unincorporated Enterprise 31.4 11.1 15.0 
Other Property Income 5.4 11.6 11.4 
Total Factor Income 82.1 92.6 95.3 
Transfer Income 17.9 7,4 4.7 
Total Personal Income 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Personal Outlav 
Consumption 87.0 86.0 79.8 
Taxes 
Income 2.3 9.6 12.7 
Social Security 2.6 3.9 1.4 
Total 4.9 13.5 14.1 
Savings 8.1 0.5 6.1 
Total Personal Income 100.0 100.0 Ioo.O 
The data in this table also support prior observations about the 
less industrialized status of France. That is, wages and salaries 
,. Commissariat General du Plan, Rapport sur Ie plan de modernisation et 
d'iquipement de I'Union franfaise, Paris, 1949, pp. 9, 10. 
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account for a smaller proportion of the personal income total in 
France than they do in Britain and the United States, while income 
derived from unincorporated enterprises is of much greater relative 
importance in the French economy. Thus both the GNP and the 
personal income data reveal, on the one hand, that France is less 
industrialized than Britain or America, and, on the other, that 
transfer or welfare expenditures are of considerably greater sig-
nificance as a source of personal income in France than is the case 
in the other two nations. 
The data in Table X pertaining to the disposition of personal 
income are of interest because of the way in which they reveal a 
sharp contrast between the tax burden assumed by the French 
citizen and that assumed by his British and American counterparts. 
In the United Kingdom and the United States direct taxes on in-
dividuals, including social security taxes, take about the same pro-
portion of personal incomes, the figures being 13.5 and 14.1 percent 
for Britain and the United States, respectively. In France, how-
ever, direct taxes are equal to only 4.9 percent of the personal 
income total. With respect to the personal income tax alone, the 
differences are even more pronounced, as in France this tax amounts 
to but 2.3 percent of personal income as compared to 9.6 percent 
in the United Kingdom and 12.7 percent in the United States. 
Social security taxes levied against the individual are, it is true, 
relatively higher in France than in the United States, but are less 
than those in effect in Great Britain. If we compare the relation-
ship between transfer income received and social security taxes 
paid, the following figures emerge: in France direct taxes paid by 
individuals for the support of social security are equal to 14.5 per-
cent of benefits received; for Britain this ration is 52.7 percent; and 
for the United States it is 3l.8 percent. Thus it appears that it is 
in the United Kingdom that the beneficiaries of the social security 
system contribute the most to the direct support of the system. In 
France, on the other hand, the direct participation by the bene-
ficiaries in this sense is least. In sum, the French consumer is bet-
ter off than his British or American counterpart in the matter of 
the direct taxation of his income, but this more favored position is 
largely illusionary, once we take into account the effect of indirect 
taxation on his real income. This point will be developed further 
in conjunction with discussion of the data contained in Table XII. 
In Table XI a comparison is made between government receipts 
and current expenditures in the countries under discussion. These 
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data permit us to see in yet another perspective the role that wel-
fare expenditures play in the economies of the three countries. They 
also point up significant differences in their tax structures. With 
respect to taxation, the greatest difference between the three coun-
tries has to do with the relative importance of direct taxation-i.e., 
taxation of the income of firms and individuals-as a source of 
government revenues. The United States depends the most upon 
direct taxes for its revenues, as the latter were equal to 58.4 per-
cent of current government expenditures in 1952. The situation in 
France is in sharp contrast to this, for here direct taxes account 
for only 14.7 percent of government expenditure. The correspond-
ing figure for the United Kingdom is 36.5 percent. On the other 
hand, indirect business taxes and social security taxes levied against 
both firms and individuals are of relatively greater import in both 
France and Great Britain than they are in the United States. It 
should be noted, too, that social security taxes levied against the 
business firm are of relatively greater weight in the French tax 
structure than they are in either the United Kingdom or the United 
States. 
''''hat conclusions can be drawn from these data? For one thing, 
the data in this table underscore further what has been said about 
the essentially indirect character of France's tax structure. The 
comparison with Britain and the United States simply makes this 
characteristic even more glaringly obvious. Second, the data lend 
support to the thesis advanced earlier that under modern conditions 
the growth of the welfare state leads to an increased dependence 
by government upon indirect taxation as a source of revenue. On 
the basis of our adopted criteria for the degree of "welfare 
statism"-i.e., the relative importance of transfer expenditures in 
the various national accounts-both France and Britain are more 
nearly welfare states than is the United States. And in both the 
former countries indirect taxation, including the social security 
taxes levied against the employer, is of greater relative significance 
than it is in the United States. In France, it is true, this situation 
is due partly to the French citizen's basic hostility toward direct 
taxation in any form, as well as outright fraud and evasion, but 
important as these factors may be they are not sufficient to account 
for the very great difference that exists between France and the 
United States in this respect. In the United Kingdom, moreover, 
the personal income tax is comparable to the American tax as 
respects progression in rates, and furthermore Britain, unlike 
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France, does not have a serious problem of tax evasion. Conse-
quently, it is reasonable to conclude that there is a direct relation-
ship between the expansion of welfare expenditures and the growth 
in the relative importance of indirect taxation in the over-all 
revenue structure. In this connection it is useful to recall that the 
data in Table IX indicate that there are no significant differences 
in the economies of the three countries with respect to the propor-
tion of the national output absorbed by the public sector for what 
we have termed the traditional functions of government. The 
significant differences that exist are in the sphere of transfer ex-
penditures. 
TABLE XI 
Government Receipts and Expenditures in 
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States: 1952 
(in percent) 
France United Kingdom United States 
Government Receipts 
Direct Taxes 
Individuals 5.6 27.3 36.6 
Firms 9.1 9.2 21.8 
Total 14.7 36.5 58.4 
Indirect Business Taxes 52.1 46.8 29.7 
Social Security Taxes 
Individuals 6.1 9.8 4.0 
Firms 19.5 10.7 3.9 
Total 25.6 20.5 7.9 
Total Tax Revenue 92.4 103.8 96.0 
Other Revenue 5.4 8.0 
Total Revenue 97.8 111.8 96.0 
Deficit (+) or Surplus (-) 2.2 - 11.8 4.0 
Total Expenditure 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Government Expenditure 
Goods and Services 50.1 59.2 82.1 
Transfers 
Net Interest 2.7 14.5 5.2 
to Individuals 36.9 18.6 12.6 
to Business 10.3 7.7 0.1 
Total Transfers 49.9 40.8 17.9 
Total Expenditure 100.0 100.0 100.0 
This last observation is confirmed by the data in Table XI per-
taining to current government expenditures in the three countries. 
In the United States government consumption accounts for 82.1 per-
cent of total government expenditure. In the United Kingdom 
and France, on the other hand, transfer expenditures are of much 
greater relative significance. In France transfers account for prac-
tically half of all current expenditures, while in Britain they repre-
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sent about two-fifths of total outlays. The contrast between the 
three countries is greatest with respect to transfer payments to 
individuals, for in France these payments equal 36.9 percent of 
total government expenditures, as compared to 18.6 percent in the 
United Kingdom, and 12.6 percent in the United States. For the 
United States and Britain interest on the public debt remains a 
transfer item of importance, although this is not true of France. 
In France and the United Kingdom, in contrast to the United 
States, subsidies to business firms are a major transfer expenditure, 
although again this item is of greater import in France. 
This analysis of the relative importance of transfer expenditures 
in relation to various national income and product aggregates in 
the respective economies of France, Britain, and the United States 
can be concluded by rearrangement of the data in yet another way. 
This is done in Table XII. The objective here is to relate taxes 
and government expenditure to the national income in a manner 
that permits us to compare the over-all impact of both taxation and 
TABLE XII 
The National Income, Taxes, and Public Expenditure 
i/1 France, the United Kingdom, and the United States: 1952 
(in percent) 
France United Kingdom United States 
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government expenditure in the three countries. National income 
is chosen as the basic magnitude against which taxes and govern-
ment expenditure are measured, for it represents the total of in-
come earned by resource owners in the process of production. We 
can then determine the proportion of private income that is chan-
neled into the government sector for public purposes, and this 
will yield us a satisfactory measure of the relative "burden" of 
government activities in the economies of the three countries. In 
the table, taxes are classified according to whether their presumed 
incidence is on consumption-i.e., prices-or incomes, and govern-
ment expenditures are grouped according to whether or not they 
are redistributive in intent. In this way we can discern not only 
what proportion of private income earned in production is chan-
neled into the public sector, but also the essential characteristics 
of the tax mechanism that brings about this transfer of income 
from private to public use. Then, the breakdown of government 
outlays into the categories of redistributive and nonredistributive 
permits us to see the relative importance of the various uses made 
by the government of the total financial resources placed at its 
disposal by the taxation process. 
Let us examine first the data on taxation. In both France and 
the United Kingdom the tax total absorbs a significantly higher 
proportion of private income earned in production than in the 
United States. In France and Great Britain the percentage figures 
are 39.5 and 40.7 respectively, while the comparable figure for the 
United States is 31.2 percent. Thus we can say that in both the 
former countries the government is more deeply involved in the 
nation's economic affairs simply because of the larger proportion 
of the national income that flows through the public sector. This 
is not unexpected, though, because of the more extensive develop-
ment of the welfare state in both France and the United Kingdom. 
But even though France and Britain divert about the same 
proportion of their respective national incomes to the government 
sector for various public purposes, there are important differences 
between the two countries as respects the means by which this is 
accomplished. Taxation is, of course, the chief instrumentality 
through which resources (real and monetary) are diverted from 
private to public use, but the kind of taxes resorted to have vastly 
different economic effects. The taxation process diverts income 
to the public sector either directly by reducing the money income 
of the consumer, as is the case with the taxation of incomes, or in-
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directly by reducing his real income through price changes, as is 
the case with excise or consumption taxes. 
Aside from this fact, there are other points of importance in-
volved in the over-all character of the tax structure. There is, first 
of all, the vital question of equity in taxation. The regressive 
character of indirect or consumption taxes is widely recognized, 
and this is a factor that cannot be ignored in an evaluation of the 
incidence of the benefits and costs associated with the welfare state. 
Furthermore, the price effects allied with indirect taxation may 
have undesirable consequences in other sectors of the economy. \Ve 
commented elsewhere in this chapter on the adverse effect that 
France's tax structure has on the nation's balance of payments 
position. Finally, it should be emphasized that indirect taxation 
tends to conceal the real costs of public activity, because the diffu-
sion of these costs throughout the economy via the price mechanism 
makes it almost impossible for the citizen to know precisely what 
proportion of his income is being absorbed for public purposes. 
The reader will without doubt, recognize in this a preference for 
direct rather than indirect taxes, simply because, in the last analysis, 
all taxes are paid out of current real income. From the standpoint 
of both equity and civic responsibility it would be preferable if this 
fact was adhered to in matters of tax policy. 
If ·we grant validity to the ideas discussed above, then the tax 
structure of France is clearly less satisfactory than that of either 
the Onited Kingdom or the United States. In France taxes on 
consumption absorb 30.6 percent of the national income, as com-
pared to 22.5 percent in Britain and only 10.9 percent in the 
United States. Taxes on income, on the other hand, equal only 
8.9 percent of the national income in France, in contrast to 18.2 per-
cent in the United Kingdom and 20.3 percent in the United States. 
In comparison to both the United Kingdom and the United 
States the over-all tax structure in France is not only more 
regressive, but constructed in such a way that an important pro-
portion of the real costs of public activity are concealed from the 
general public. The system, moreover, is badly adapted to combat 
inflation; on the contrary it is in a sense an engine of inflation, for 
with the large role accorded to indirect taxation, any increase in 
taxes will have adverse repercussions on the price level. To sum-
marize the analysis at this point, we can say that as respects France 
and the United Kingdom the relative tax burden of the two coun-
tries is about the same, but the distribution of the tax burden in 
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France is less equitable than in Britain, while the adverse effects 
of the tax system on the economy are undoubtedly greater in 
France than they are in the United Kingdom. These same con-
clusions apply with respect to France and the United States, except 
that the over-all tax burden is significantly lower in the United 
States. 
The data on the distribution of public expenditures between 
those that are redistributive in character and those that are not 
simply add an additional confirmation to our previous observations 
on the greater importance of transfer expenditures in France's 
economy as compared to the economies of the United Kingdom and 
the United States. In France redistributive expenditures equal 
20.1 percent of the national income, while the corresponding figures 
for Britain and the United States are 10.3 and 4.1 percent. respec-
tively. Since the percentage differences in government consumption 
for the three countries are not nearly so great, the conclusion is 
inescapable that transfer payments are the major factor responsible 
for the relatively larger role that the public sector occupies in the 
French economy. 
The conclusions reached in this chapter may be briefly sum-
marized as follows. First, all of the data that we have examined 
pertaining to national product, personal income, taxation, and 
government expenditure support the hypothesis that France has 
become more of a welfare state than either the United Kingdom or 
the United States, providing we accept as our measurement criterion 
the various ratios that exist between transfer expenditures for 
welfare purposes and other key economic aggregates. 
Second, these same data show that the French economy is less 
industrialized than the economies of either the United Kingdom 
or the United States, and consequently less favorably situated from 
the standpoint of being able to support the real costs of the wel-
fare state. The latter point rests upon the assumption that there 
exists a direct relationship between industrialization and real 
income, and that the real income level necessarily imposes practical 
limitations on the extent to which income can be redistributed 
without resort to indirect taxation. 
Finally, the data reveal that France's tax structure is badly 
designed, from the standpoint of equity for the citizen and that of 
measurement of the real costs of public activity. It goes without 
saying that the latter is an inescapable necessity for responsible 
policy-making in a democratic society. From the point of view of 
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the functioning of France's social security system, the excessive 
dependence of the state upon indirect taxation means that there 
is much uncertainty about the real incidence of the system's costs 
and, as a consequence, no assurance that the system in its over-all 
impact is necessarily progressive. 
4 / _ The Distribution of Income in France 
I N CHAPTER 3 we analyzed the welfare state in France from the point of view of the impact of welfare expenditures on the budg-et of the state and the national income. In this chapter we shall 
analyze the distribution of money income in France, paying par-
ticular attention to the effect of welfare expenditures on the pattern 
of income distribution. As in the previous chapter, most of the 
data are presented in percentage form, as our primary purpose is 
to effect comparisons. 
The actual distribution of money income in France's economy 
will be studied from three points of view: (1) the distribution of 
income between social classes; (2) the distribution of income be-
tween income classes or brackets; and (3) the distribution of in-
come within the social classes by range of income. In each of these 
categories the distribution of income resulting from participation 
in the productive process-i.e., factor income-will be discussed, and 
then the impact of welfare expenditures upon this distribution will 
be analyzed. Within the limits of available data, the distribution 
of factor income corresponds to the concept of an initial distribution 
of income discussed in Chapter 1, while transfer expenditures reflect 
policy measures designed to alter the distribution of income,1 
In a broad sense, redistribution of income in a society may be 
either vertical or horizontal. The term "vertical" refers to the re-
distribution of money income between different income groups, i.e., 
from the upper to the lower income ranges, and the usual mechanism 
for this is the progressive income tax. "Horizontal," on the other 
hand, refers to the redistribution of income among members of the 
same income class. Welfare benefits that accrue to persons on some 
1 See the tables in the appendix for these data in absolute amount. 
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basis other than their income status may bring about a horizontal 
redistribution. This is the case, for example, with family allowances, 
for they tend to redistribute income from small to large families, 
irrespective of the income status of the latter. As respects the dis-
tribution of income between social groups, welfare expenditures 
may bring about a vertical redistribution if a particular social group 
has a decidedly more unfavorable income status than other groups 
in the society and benefits to a greater extent than others from 
welfare expenditures. As was pointed out in Chapter I, the actual 
pattern of income redistribution resulting from the functioning 
of the apparatus of the welfare state depends upon both the nature 
and incidence of benefits and the means employed to finance them. 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME BETWEEN SOCIAL CLASSES 
In this section we shall analyze the distribution of income be-
tween the major social classes in France. The classes or groups 
treated are: farmers other than wage-workers in agriculture; the 
self-employed; wage and salary employees; and the nonactive popu-
lation. The latter, of course, does not include dependents of per-
sons in the first three categories, but does include all other persons 
receiving either factor or transfer income. The data analyzed in 
this section do not include either income received by nonnationals 
residing in France or French nationals living abroad. The groups 
discussed in the section are determined on the basis of the major 
source of income for the head of the household, and the resulting 
categories correspond roughly to the division of French society 
along class lines.2 
Table XIII shows (in percent) both the major sources of personal 
income for persons in the above-mentioned social categories and 
the disposition made of this income. The major objective of these 
data is to indicate the relative importance of transfer or welfare 
expenditures as a source of income on a social or class basis. In 
Chapter 3 we examined the importance of transfer expenditures 
2 A word of caution is in order here. for there are additional and subtle class 
distinctions in French SOciety within these very broad social categories. The wage-
earner group, for example, lumps together wage-earners proper-Le., "workers" 
-and all other salaried employees, including high civil servants and persons in 
the upper echelons of management. Obviously there are class distinctions of 
importance between such permns. In the self-employed category there are not 
only small businessmen in trade and commerce but artisans and, as well, mem-
bers of the liberal professions. At best, then, these categories correspond only 
approximately to the highly stratified class structure of French society. 
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in the personal income account for the economy as a whole (Tables 
VI, X); here we are concerned with the extent to which persons 
belonging to a particular class or social group benefit from these 
expenditures. 
On the basis of the data in Table XIII it is apparent that the 
major beneficiaries of welfare expenditures in France are to be 
found in the nonactive segment of the population. Persons in this 
category derive 57.3 percent of their money incomes from transfer 
expenditures, and only 42.7 percent from factor payments. This 
means, in other words, that the social security system functions in 
such a way as to bring about a significantly large transfer of money 
income from the active to the nonactive population. This is not 
surprising, however, in view of the fact that pensions for retired 
and disabled workers constitute one of the most important elements 
of the system. The actual amounts of income transferred via the 
mechanism of the social security system will be examined sub-
sequently. 
Wage-earners are the second most important group of bene-
TABLE XIII 
Personal Income and Outlay by Social Groups: 1952 
(in percent) 
Self- Wage- Non-
Farmers Employed Earners active Total' 
Sources of Income 
From Production 
Wages and Salaries 7.3 11.8 75.0 21.2 44.1 
Unincorporated 
Enterprise 81.8 78.3 3.9 5.7 32.7 
Other Property 
Income 2.5 3.8 3.0 15.8 4.6 
-- --
Total 91.6 93.9 81.9 42.7 81.4 
From Transfers 
Social Security 4.2 2.4 15.2 44.0 14.1 
Assistance 2.9 1.4 2.5 8.9 3.1 
Other 1.3 2.3 0.4 4.4 1.4 
Total SA 6.f lsI 57.3 18.6 
Personal Income 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Personal Outlay 
Consumption 94.3 84.5 87.9 83.8 87.6 
Taxes 
Income 0.9 4.1 2.5 1.4 2.5 
Social Security 0.4 2.4 3.8 1.2 2.7 
Total 1.3 6.5 6.3 2.6 5.2 
Personal Savings 4.4 9.0 5.8 13.6 7.2 
Personal Income 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
,.. A \'erage for the economy. 
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ficiaries of the social security system, as persons in this class receive 
IS.1 percent of their incomes in the form of transfer payments and 
SI.9 percent from participation in production. Farmers obtain S.4 
percent of their income from transfers and 91.6 percent from factor 
payments, while the self-employed benefit the least from the system, 
receiving only 6.1 percent of their personal incomes from transfers 
and 93.9 percent in the form of factor income. On the basis, then, 
of the relative importance of transfer expenditures as a source of 
personal income, our conclusion at this point is simply that the 
transfer mechanism of the social security system favors the non-
active population and wage-earners the most, and farmers and self-
employed the least. 
The data on the disposition of personal income in Table XIlI 
are of interest primarily because of what they reveal about the rela-
tive tax burden for the different social classes. In Chapter 3 we 
pointed out that the direct tax burden on the individual is not 
particularly heavy in France, especially when compared to the 
United Kingdom and the United States. Of equal interest and 
significance is the allocation of direct taxes among the social groups 
in the economy. From the point of view of the proportion of per-
sonal income paid out in taxes, farmers are in the most favored 
position in French society, as only 1.3 percent of their personal 
income goes for tax payments, including both income and social 
security taxes. Actually farmers are in a more favorable position 
than persons in the nonactive category, even though members of 
the latter group are, on the average, less well off in terms of personal 
income than any other group in France (see Tables XV, XVI, and 
XVII). The major reason for this is the favoritism accorded the 
agricultural sector of the economy by the tax authorities. Of equal 
significance is the fact that the tax situation for wage-earners and 
the self-employed is approximately the same, even though the aver-
age income for members of these two groups differs widely. Direct 
taxes take 6.3 percent of the wage-earner's income as compared to 
only 6.5 percent for the self-employed. Again, the chief reason for 
this is the widespread practice of fraud and evasion among the self-
employed.3 
The actual pattern of income distribution between the major 
social groups is indicated by the data in Table XIV. This table 
8 See Note 4, Chapter 3. 
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TABLE XIV 
Distribution of Households, Income, Consumption, and 
Taxes by Social Groups: 1952 
(Percent of Totals) 
Farmers Self· Employed Wage.Earners 
Number of Households 14:1 13.4 51.7 
Income from Production 17.4 25.6 50.8 
Transfer Income 6.9 7.2 49.3 
Personal Income 15:1 22.2 50.5 
Consumption 16.6 21.4 50.6 
Taxes 4.1 27.9 62.1 
Income 5.9 36.7 50.8 










shows the proportion of households4 to be found in each social 
class, as well as the proportion of total factor and transfer income 
received by members of the class. Similar data are included for 
consumption expenditures and tax payments. Analysis of these data 
permit us to see not only the income distribution pattern resulting 
from the productive process, but also the way in which this pattern 
is modified by the mechanism of transfer payments. 
The first fact that emerges from the table is that the distribution 
of income from production is skewed in favor of the farmers and 
the self-employed. The latter class contains 13.4 percent of the 
households in the economy, but receives 25.6 percent of the income 
from production. Farmers, on the other hand, account for 14.4 
percent of the households, and obtain 17.4 percent of the national 
income. Wage-earners receive approximately the same percentage 
share of the national income total as the proportion of wage·earner 
households in the economy, the respective amounts being 50.8 and 
51.7 percent. The nonactive group is clearly the least-favored social 
class, as this category accounts for 20.5 percent of the household 
total, and receives but 6.2 percent of the national income. The 
picture is one of a relatively unequal distribution of initial or 
factor income as between social classes, with the self-employed being 
in the most-favored position and the nonactive in the least-favored. 
The problem now becomes one of analyzing the impact of wel-
fare or transfer expenditures on this distribution of income. For 
this we must look at the distribution of transfer income among the 
social classes, and the effects of the latter on the final distribution of 
• The t.erm "household" i~ used to mean all persons living together who 
normally pool their incomes to meet the major household expenditures. The 
household, consequently, will not necessarily coincide with the family unit. 
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personal income. The data in the table show that the distribution 
of transfer income is skewed in the direction of the nonactive and 
wage-earner classes; consequently, the over-all effect of transfer 
expenditures is to reduce somewhat the inequality of the distribu-
tion of factor income between social classes. The nonactive popula-
tion, with 20.5 percent of the total households, receives 36.6 percent 
of the total of transfer income, while wage-earners, with 51.7 percent 
of the households, receive 49.3 percent of the transfer income total. 
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and 7.2 percent respectively of the total of transfer payments. The 
over-all effect, then, is to reduce the share of farmers in the total 
from 17.4 percent (factor income) to 15.4 percent (personal income); 
the share of the self-employed from 25.6 to 22.2 percent; the share 
of wage-earners from 50.8 to 50.5 percent; and, finally, to increase 
the share of the nonactive population from 6.2 to 11.9 percent. 
These results are shown in graphic form in Diagram II. These data 
also lend strength to the earlier conclusion that the workings of 
the social security system favor the nonactive and wage-earner seg-
ments of the population to the greatest extent. Wage-earners, it 
may be noted, receive the largest portion of the transfer income 
total, even though this does not alter the over-all distribution of 
income between social groups in the wage-earner's favor. 
The remaining data in Table XIV pertain to the distribution 
of consumption expenditure and tax payments between social 
groups. With respect to the distribution of consumption expendi-
ture there is little that needs to be said, as the pattern of consump-
tion expenditure by social groups approximately parallels the pat-
tern of income distribution. This is to be more or less expected 
since the average level of real income in France is low relative to, 
say, the United States. One would expect, however, that as the 
average level of real income rises the distribution of consumption 
expenditures would be less unequal than the distribution of in-
come. This is so because a highly industrialized economy with its 
emphasis upon mass production of standardized commodities re-
quires for its effective functioning a mass consumption of these 
commodities.5 
The data on the distribution of taxes-income and social security 
-underscore further earlier conclusions concerning the inequities 
inherent in France's tax structure. Farmers, according to Table XIV, 
again appear as a highly favored class, as with 14.4 percent of the 
households and 15.4 percent of the personal income total, they pay 
only 4.1 percent of the total for all direct taxes. These data also 
show farmers to be in a more favored position than the nonactive 
segment of the population; the latter group receives a smaller pro-
portion of the personal income total, but carries a larger share of 
the tax total. The data on the self-employed and the wage-earner 
classes indicate that these two groups have, in relation to their share 
• This appears to have been the case in the United States. See Sidney Wein-
traub, Income and Employment Analysis, New York: Pitman, 1951, esp. Ch. 4. 
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in the income total, about the same proportion of the total tax 
load. Wage-earners receive 50.5 percent of the personal income 
total and pay 62.1 percent of the total of direct taxes, while the 
self-employed obtain 22.2 percent of the income total and pay 27.9 
percent of the tax total. 
The relative position of the different social classes with respect 
to taxation can be seen more clearly if we compare for each group 
the ratio of its proportionate share in the income total to its pro-
portionate share in the total of taxes. If all direct taxes were levied 
on a strict proportional basis, this ratio would be 1.00 for each 
group. This is so because with proportional taxation a group re-
ceiving, for example, 25 percent of the income total would pay 25 
percent of the tax total. This ratio cannot, of course, tell us any-
thing about what should be, in the interests of equity, the degree 
of progression in the tax system, but it will reveal for a particular 
social group whether or not its share of the tax burden is pro-
portionally greater or smaller than its share of the income total. 
Thus a ratio greater than 1.00 indicates that a group's share in the 
total tax burden is smaller than its share in the income total, and 
a ratio less than 1.00 indicates that the group's share in the tax 
burden is greater than its share in the income total. By comparing 
these ratios for all the social groups we can get some idea of the 
extent to which the tax burden for any particular group is progres-
sive or regressive relative to the other groups in the economy. 
The ratios for each social group for both the total of direct taxes, 
and income and social security taxes considered separately, are 
shown below: 
Self· Wage- ~on-
Farmers Employed Earners active 
All Taxes 3.75 0.79 0.81 2.01 
Income Taxes 2.61 0.60 0.99 1.80 
Social Security Taxes 6.16 1.12 0.69 2.20. 
The ratios demonstrate conclusively the favored pOSitIOn of 
farmers in the economy; for all three tax categories the agricultural 
ratio is higher than the ratios for any of the other groups. This 
means simply that the effective rate of taxation on personal in-
comes in this sector is lower than it is for persons in any of the other 
social classes. It means, too, that the tax structure is regressive as 
between agriculture and some parts of the economy. Farmers are 
taxed at a lower effective rate than wage-earners or the nonactive 
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sector, even though the farmer's relative share in the income total 
is greater than that of either of these groups, although there are 
proportionally fewer agricultural households. 
The ratio for the total of direct taxes is almost the same for the 
self-employed and the wage-earners, even though the former group 
receives a relatively larger share of the income total in relation 
to its share in the number of households. With respect to the in-
come tax alone, the ratios indicate there is some progression in the 
effective rate of taxation as between the self-employed and the 
wage-earners, but that this difference is largely offset by the fact 
that for the latter group, the effective rate of social security taxation 
is higher than it is for the self-employed. Thus the effective rate 
of total taxation is seen to be about the same for the two groups. 
notwithstanding the large disparity in their relative income posi-
tions. The ratios for the nonactive segments of the population show 
that the tax structure is mildly progressive as respects the relative 
income position of persons in this category, but less favorable to 
members of this group than to persons in the agricultural sector. 
The over-all picture resulting from the comparison of these 
ratios is one of an arbitrary and inequitable tax structure. With 
respect to the relative income position of the different social classes, 
the tax structure cannot by any stretch of the imagination be 
labeled progressive.6 Farmers are an especially favored group, and 
the wage-earner class assumes a larger share of the total tax burden 
than is justified by its relative share in the income total. The self-
employed, while not so favorably treated as the agriculturists, are 
taxed much less heavily in relation to their income status than are 
the wage-earners. It is only with respect to the nonactive segment 
of the population that the tax structure appears to be progressive 
in any fair sense of the term. 
• There is, of course, no objective criterion by which the "proper" amount of 
progression in the tax structure can be determined. In fact it seems to the 
writer that the view that, in the interests of equity, progression in the taxation 
of incomes is necessary, rests, in the last analysis, upon a value judgement. Use 
of the concept of diminishing marginal utility to justify progression in income 
taxation no longer seems appropriate on either theoretical or practical grounds. 
\V'hat is left, essentially, is the fact that progre~sive taxation is accepted as a 
reasonable and equitable form of taxation in modern society, and the appropri· 
ate degree of progression must remain a matter about which reasonable men 
will differ. The same holds true with respect to the alleged adverse effects of 
progressive taxation 011 incentives to produce, for there is no objective criterion 
by means of which the point at which progression impedes incentives can be 
determined. 
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The analysis of the distribution of income between social groups 
will not be complete without examination of the income position 
of persons in each of these groups on the basis of the average in-
come per household and per capita. The distribution of the total 
income among social groups does not in itself tell the whole story 
of the relative income position of the various groups in the economy. 
For this we need to make use of averages, such as income per house-
hold and income per capita, as these permit us to make a more 
direct comparison of the income status of persons in the different 
economic sectors. This is done in Tables XV, XVI, and XVII, which 
show average income and taxes per household and per capita for 
each of the social groups under consideration.7 
TABLE XV 
Income and Taxes per Household by Social Groups: 1952 
(in francs and percent) 
Income Percent Taxes 
Social Group per of National per 
Household Average Household 
Farmers 814,213 106.7 11,168 
Self-Employed 1,266,301 166.0 81,644 
'V age-Earners 744,721 97.6 47,059 
;\ionactive 443,010 58.1 1l,469 
Average for 









In Table XV the data pertain to average income per household. 
The income data in the table are for total income, including trans-
fer payments, and thus they represent an average based upon the 
distribution of the personal income total shown in Table XIV. As 
respects income per household, the self-employed are in the most 
favorable position, as the average income per household for families 
in this category is 66 percent greater than the average for the 
economy as a whole. Farmers have an average income per household 
slightly higher than the national average, while wage-earners are 
slightly below the national average. The nonactive segment is 
clearly the least favored, as the average income per household III 
this category is only 58.1 percent of the national average. 
7 The data in Table XVII are derived by converting the franc amounts in 
Tables XV and XVI to dollars at the official rate of exchange of 420 francs to 
the dollar. These data give only an approximation of the real value of the in-
come figures expressed in dollars because the offiCIal rate of exchange does not 
necessarily reflect real differences in the purchasing power of the two currencies. 
Moreover, the consumption patterns of households in the United States and 
France are by no means identical. 
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The previously mentioned disparities in the tax position of the 
different social classes are reflected in the data in this table. Farmers 
are the most favored, while the direct tax burden on wage-earner 
and self-employed households is of about the same magnitude, even 
though the income of the latter is, on the average, over 66 percent 
greater than that of wage-earner households. Taxes as a percent 
of income per household are lower for the nonactive group than 
for either the wage-earners or the self-employed, but higher than 
for the farmers. Once more the evidence points to the absence of 
any significant degree of progression in the structure of direct taxes. 
The income position of the social groups vis-a-vis one another 
appears in a somewhat different perspective if we examine the 
data pertaining to average incomes per capita in each of the social 
categories. These data appear in Table XVI. Income per capita is 
perhaps a somewhat better measure than income per household 
of the relative poverty or affluence characteristic of a given social 
class. This is because of differences in the size of the typical house-
hold in the various social groups. The average income per house-
hold may be higher for a given social class than, say, the average for 
the economy, but the real income level for the same class may be 
lower than the national average if this income is spread over a 
larger number of persons. This is the situation in France, as the 
average number of persons per household varies significantly from 
one class to another. Agriculture leads in this respect, with an 
average of 4.1 persons per household. For the self-employed the 
average is 3.2 persons per household, as it is for the wage-earner 
class. Households are smallest in the nonactive group, with an 
average of only 2.2 persons per household.s 
TABLE XVI 
Income and Taxes per Capita by Social Groups: 1952 
(in francs and percent) 
Income Percent Taxes 
Social Group per of National per 
Capita Average Capita 
Farmers 199,254 8l.6 2,732 
Self-Employed 391,694 160.4 25,254 
'Vage-Earners 234,031 95.2 14,788 
Nonactive 199,354 8l.6 5,161 
Average for 









• l\Iinistcre des Finances, des Affaires t.conomiques, et du Plan, Rappm·t sur 
les Comptes de fa Nation, Vol. n, Paris, 1955, p. 243. 
The Distribution of Income in Fmnce / 77 
The per capita data, consequently, change somewhat the picture 
of the relative economic position of persons in the different social 
groups. In the main, agriculture is seen as less favorably situated 
than is indicated by the average income per household data, while 
the nonactive class is somewhat better off. Essentially these data 
show that the two major problem areas of France's economy.as far 
as poverty is concerned are the agricultural sector and the nonactive 














Average Income Per Household and Per Capita 
For Farmers, Wage.Earners, and· Nonactive 
Population as a Percent of the Average 
Income of the Self.Employed 













" " E ., E ., 
~ 
'" 
.; r; '" ·Ei i:i ~ \J ~ \J ~ '" ., ~ .. 5 
= 
5 
= :; '" ., .. '" ~ " Z '" ~ ~ .... ~
Social Classes 
• Poverty, of course, is a relative term. The word has no objective meaning, 
and it is used here only as a descriptive term applied to segments of France~s 
economy thal are less well off than others. 
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expected in any society, since retired workers and other persons not 
able to work cannot, for the most part, obtain incomes on a par with 
the economically active segment of the population. The existence of 
sub-par income levels among the inactive segment of the popula-
tion is, to be sure, a serious economic problem in most western coun-
tries, but it is mitigated to some extent by the fact that consumption 
needs of persons in this category are frequently lower than the 
needs of persons in other sectors of the economy. The relatively 
low level of per capita income in the agricultural sector of France's 
economy is largely a consequence of technological backwardness in 
this sector and the relatively large proportion of the labor force still 
engaged in primary pursuits.10 The real solution for agricultural 
poverty lies in a continuation of the industrialization and moderni-
zation programs that France has been pushing since the end of the 
war. 
The differences just discussed between the income per house· 
hold and the income per capita data as respects the relative income 
position of persons in the four social classes are shown graphically 
in Diagram III. In this diagram both income per household and 
income per capita for the farmers, wage-earners, and nonactive 
group are expressed as a percentage of these same magnitudes for 
the self-employed. This diagram permits us to see how the income 
position of these three groups compares with that of the most 
favored group on both a per household and per capita basis. 
TABLE XVII 
Income and Taxes per Household and per Capita 
by Social Groups: 1952 
(in dollars) 
Income Taxes Income 
Social Group per per per 
Household Household Capita 
Farmers $ 2,326 $ 32 $ 569 
Self-Employed 3,618 233 1,119 
Wage-Earners 2,128 13:, 669 
Nonactive 1,237 33 569 
Average for 









10 In 1953, 30.8 percent of France's labor force was still employed in agricul-
ture. National income per employed person is also lower in agriculture than in 
any other sector of the economy. See "The National Product and Structural 
Change in the French Economy," op. cit. 
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Before turning to the discussion of the distribution of income by 
income range or bracket, we need to analyze the net gain or loss of 
income that each social group experiences as a result of the opera-
tion of the social security system. This is done in Table XVIII, 
which indicates for each social class the amount of income received 
by members of the class in the form of social security benefits, and 
the amount of taxes paid by members of the class for the direct 
support of the social security system. The difference between these 
two sums measures the extent to which the group or class gains 
or loses income through the mechanism of the social security 
system. In connection with this latter point, it is important to note 
that if the social security system were designed to avoid all transfers 
of income between social groups, and if it were financed wholly by 
contributions from the beneficiaries, there would be neither a net 
gain nor loss for each of the different social categories taken as a 
whole. Such a system, if it could exist and function, would simply 
redistribute income among members of the same social class. In 
such an instance, the most characteristic form of redistribution 
would be from the active to the nonactive population, although 
this would be modified to some extent by the existence of a system 
of family allowances. 
TABLE XVIII 
Net Transfers of Income by Social Groups: 1952 
(billions of francs) 
Self- Wage- Non-
Farmers Employed Earllers active 
Social Security Income 68 56 798 544 
Social Security Taxes 7 55 202 15 





But as the data in Table XVIII reveal, this is not the case as 
respects the workings of the French social security system. As a 
matter of fact all of the social classes under consideration experience 
a net gain in money income from the system, although the amount 
of the gain is of negligible importance in the case of the self-em-
ployed. The wage-earners and the nonactive population gain the 
most, as these two groups receive the overwhelming proportion of 
the net amount of income transferred by the social security mechan-
ism. 
At first glance the data in this table may seem to be curiously 
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paradoxical, for the statement that all social classes experience a 
net gain seems to suggest income is being transferred in such a 
way that everyone gains and nobody loses. This, of course, is mani· 
festly impossible, for the idea of a transfer of income inherently 
means that some person or group in the economy receives income 
at the expense of some other person or group. The solution to this 
apparently paradoxical situation in France resides in the fact that 
the great bulk of these income transfers are financed by indirect 
taxation. As shown in Table XVIII, individuals in the aggregate 
pay into the public treasury only 279 billions of francs to finance 
social security expenditures, but they draw benefits from the 
treasury with a value of 1,466 billions of francs. The significance 
of this is that the amount of real income transferred between social 
groups possibly may. be greater than is suggested by available data, 
but in the absence of accurate information on consumption patterns, 
the whole incidence of the costs of social security is indeterminate. 
We are left, too, with the probability that most of the incidence of 
the system is on the beneficaries because of the price effects as-
sociated with indirect taxation. Wage-earners and other major 
beneficiaries of the system, in other words, no doubt pay enough 
in higher consumption taxes to offset the monetary benefits they 
receive from the system. 
We can summarize tl1e major conclusions reached in this section 
as follows: First, the distribution of income among the major social 
classes in France is relatively unequal, the farmers and the sel£-
employed being the most favored, while wage-earners and the non-
active population are the least favored. Second, the mechanism of 
transfer expenditures modifies the distribution of personal income 
so as to improve somewhat the relative income position of the non-
active portion of the population. The social security system, in 
other words, does operate to reduce inequalities in the distribution 
of income between social classes. Third, the data pertaining to 
taxes and the distribution of the total of direct taxes between social 
groups reveal that the tax structure is not in any sense equitable, 
if some significant degree of progression in the tax structure is 
deemed desirable from the point of view of equity. These same 
tax data lend statistical support to the widely held view that fraud 
and evasion are commonplace in France. Finally, no clear-cut 
pattern of income redistribution between social classes emerges 
because of the great extent to which the social security system de-
pends upon indirect taxation as a source. 
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THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME BY INCOME RANGE 
From the analysis of the distribution of income between social 
classes, we now turn to a discussion of the distribution of income 
by range or class of income. The framework of analysis will be 
similar to that employed in the previous section. First, we will 
determine the major sources of income for each of the income 
classes;l1 second, we will analyze the distribution of households, 
income, consumption, and taxes by income range; and, finally, we 
will discuss the relative position of the different income classes on 
the basis of the average income per household and per capita. In 
the previous section we were concerned with inequalities between 
social classes or groups; here our concern is with inequalities be-
tween individuals or households, irrespective of social class or major 
source of income. The analysis also permits us to see to what extent, 
if any, the social security system is a mechanism for a vertical re-
distribution of income. 
Table XIX contains data (in percent) on the origins of personal 
income for households in four income brackets and, as well, the 
disposition of this income. The pattern revealed by these data as 
to the origin of personal income is clear-cut. Transfer payments are 
of greatest significance as a source of personal income for house-
holds in the lowest brackets, and of least significance for house-
holds in the upper income brackets. Households whose annual 
average income is less than 535,900 francs ($1,530) derive 33.1 per-
cent of their money income from transfers, while households having 
an average annual income of over 1,398,000 francs ($3,944) obtain 
only 7.7 percent of their personal income from this source. The 
data show, moreover, that transfer expenditures are progressive, 
in that the proportion of personal income originating from transfer 
payments declines as one moves from the lower to the upper 
brackets of the income scale. There is only one other thing to note 
here, and this is that wage and salary income becomes increasingly 
less important as a source of income in the upper ranges; con-
versely, entrepreneurial and other forms of property income be-
11 Unfortunately frop! the standpoint of more precision in the analysis, the 
available data permit the use of only four income classes or brackets. It is only 
recently that any systematic attempt has been made to measure statistically the 
distribution of income in France, long recognized by most authorities to be 
highly unequal. The data upon which this study is based constitt!lte, to the best 
of the writer's kuowledge, the most recent and complete information on the suh-
ject. 
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come more significant as an income source in these ranges. This 
pattern is in accord with earlier observations concerning the rela-
tive income position of the different social classes. That is to say, 
the largest proportion of the self-employed households are to be 
found in the upper income brackets, while the majority of wage-
earner households are in the lower brackets (see Table XXVI). In 
general, too, the data in Table XIX confirm conclusions previously 
offered to the effect that the social security mechanism does improve 
the income position of households least favorably situated. 
TABLE XIX 
Personal Income and Outlay by Income Range: 1952 
(in percent) 
Income Range" 
A B C 
Sources ot Income 
From Production 
\Vages and Salaries 47.2 57.6 43.0 
Individual Enterprise 19.1 18.3 39.0 
Other Property Income 0.6 lA 4.9 
Total ~ 77.3 86.9 
From Transfers 
Social Insurance 2,;.7 19.0 9.9 
Assistance 6.1 3.1 2.4 
Other 1.3 0.6 0.8 
Total "331 22.7 l3J." 
Personal Income 100.0 '100.0 100.0 
Personal Outlay 
Consumption 103.8 89.8 84.4 
Taxes 
Income 0.4 1.5 3.0 
Social Security 2.4 3.1 2.9 
Total ---u -n; ----:5.9' 
Personal Savings - 6.6 5.6 9.7 
Personal Income 100.0 100.0 100.0 
.. The income ranges are as follows: 
A: Less than 535,900 trancs ($1,530). 
B: 535,900 to 932,000 francs ($1,530 to $2,662). 
c: 932,000 to 1,398,000 francs ($2,662 to $3,994). 

















The remaining data in this table pertain to consumption, taxes, 
and personal savings. With respect to consumption and savings, the 
pattern is essentially Keynesian, as the proportion of income saved 
increases sharply in moving from the lower to the upper income 
groups. In the lowest income bracket, consumption is in excess of 
income-i.e., savings are negative-but in the highest income bracket, 
savings amount to 17.2 percent of personal income. 
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The data on tax payments lead to conclusions concerning 
France's tax structure similar to those reached earlier, in that the 
proportion of income devoted to tax payments by households in the 
different income brackets does not differ greatly even though there 
are large disparities in the money income of households in the 
different ranges (see Tables XXII, XXIII) . In contrast to the tax 
position of the different social classes though, some progression is 
evident in the tax structure when the income data are arrayed by 
income class. But the degree of progession is very slight, as the 
effective rate of taxation (income and social security taxes) is only 
6.8 percent of personal income for the highest income bracket, as 
contrasted to 2.8 percent for the lowest bracket. Yet the average 
income per household at the upper range of the income scale is 
more than four times larger than the average at the lower end of 
the scale (see Table XXII). 
The effective rate of taxation for the personal income tax alone 
is slightly more progressive, ranging from 0.4 percent of personal 
income for the lowest income class to 4.9 percent for the highest 
income bracket. But social security taxation is regressive, and this, 
of course, makes the tax structure less progressive in an over-all 
sense. 
The extent to which the structure of both transfer expenditures 
and tax payments is progressive is demonstrated graphically in 
Diagram IV. This diagram shows for each income class the pro-
portion of personal income received in the form of transfer pay-
ments and the proportion of income absorbed by tax payments. 
The steepness of the slope of the appropriate lines in the diagram 
indicates the extent to which both transfer payments and taxes are 
progressive. It can easily be seen that transfer payments are rela-
tively more progressive than direct taxes. The diagram also shows 
that the combined effect of transfer expenditures and tax payments 
does not bring about a vertical redistribution of income between 
income classes in France. For this to happen it would be necessary 
for the lines representing social security benefits and social security 
taxes to cross, as a vertical redistribution can come about only if 
some income groups pay more in taxes than they receive in benefits. 
What Diagram IV actually shows is a situation analogous to that 
which exists between the social classes. All of the income classes, 
in other words, receive more in the way of money income in the 
form of transfer payments than they payout in the form of direct 
taxes. 
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Diagram IV 
Transfer Income and Taxes as a 
Proportion of Personal Income by Income Range 
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----- Total Direct Taxes 
------------- Social Sec\lrity Taxes 






A B c D 
Income Range 
The actual amounts of income received as social security bene-
fits and the social security taxes paid by households in each of the 
income classes are shown in Table XX. These data indicate a net 
gain for all income ranges, although the amount of the gain is 
greatest for the two lowest income brackets. The gain for the 
highest income class is negligible in amount. The explanation for 
this is the same as that advanced during the earlier discussion of 
the fact that all social classes experience a net gain in money income 
from the operation of the social security system, i.e., it results from 
the system's dependence upon indirect taxation for the major por-
tion of its revenues. Consequently, we cannot make any categorical 
statement as to whether or not the social security system brings 
about a vertical redistribution of real income. The monetary bene-
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fits of the system, to be sure, are directed primarily to the lower 
income groups, but the incidence of all the taxes that support the 
system remains largely indeterminate. We must of necessity, then, 
fall back on our earlier conclusion to the effect that the system's 
costs are, in the last analysis, borne largely by its beneficiaries. No 
other conclusion seems tenable, given the preponderant role as-
sumed by indirect taxation in France's tax structure. 
TABLE XX 
Net Transfers of Income by Income Range: 1952* 
(in billions of francs) 
Income Range· 
A B 
Social Security Income 401 741 
Social Security Taxes 37 120 
Net Gain or Loss 364 621 
• The income ranges are as follows: 
A: Less than 535,900 francs ($1,530). 
B: 535,900 to 932,000 francs ($1,530 to $2,662). 
c: 932,000 to 1,398,000 francs ($2,662 to $3,994). 













The next step in the analysis is to view the proportionate dis-
tribution of income, consumption, and taxes among the households 
situated in each of the income classes. These data are shown in 
Table XXI. The statistics here show, first of all, that the dis-
TABLE XXI 
Distribution of Households, Income, Consumption, 
and Taxes by Income Range: 1952 
(percen t of totals) 
Income Range· 
A B C 
Number of Households 















• The income ranges are as follows: 









B: 535,900 to 932,000 francs ($1,530 to $2,662). 
c: 932,000 to 1,398,000 francs. ($2,662 to $3,994). 
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tribution of factor income is relatively unequal.12 At the lower 
range of the income scale there are 30.2 percent of the total of 
households in the economy, but these households receive only 12.4 
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12 IneQualitv in the distribution of income is, like progression in taxation, a 
subjective concept. There are, in other words, no objective criteria to determine 
how much equality or inequality in the distribution of income is a "good" 
thing. This again is a matter of relative values, and a statement as above to the 
effect that the distribution of income is relativelv uneaual mllst necessarily be 
an expression of the writer's judgement. But as is the case with the progressive 
income tax, the writer would argue that a more equal distribution of the national 
income has become a widely accepted social objective in western societies. 
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the scale there are 9.6 percent of the economy's households, and 
these command 23.2 percent of the factor income. The distribution 
of transfer income is, however, skewed heavily in favor of house-
holds in the lower brackets; hence, the major effect of the system of 
transfers is to reduce inequality in the distribution of money income 
between the income classes. The percentage share of the lowest 
bracket in the income total is increased from 12.4 to 15.0, and the 
percentage share of the highest bracket is reduced from 23.2 to 20.5. 
The over-all effect of transfer payments on the distribution of 
money income in the economy is shown graphically in Diagram V.13 
From the diagram it may be noted also that the distribution of 
consumption expenditure is slightly less unequal than the distribu-
tion of income. 
For analysis of the distribution of the tax burden among the 
income classes, we will resort to the same ratios employed when 
allocation of the tax burden among social classes was being con-
sidered. These ratios, it will be recalled, relate the proportionate 
share of a group in the income total to its proportionate share in 
the tax total. The ratios for each of the income ranges and for 
both the total of all direct taxes and income and social security 
taxes considered separately are shown below: 
Income Range 
A B C D 
All Taxes 1.85 1.10 0.86 0.76 
Income Taxes 6.25 1.57 0.81 0.50 
Social Security Taxes 1.20 0.87 0.91 1.43 
These ratios indicate, first, that for all direct taxes the tax 
structure is slightly progressive, since the ratios decline in moving 
from the lower to the upper income ranges;14 and, second, that the 
18 This is a Lorenz-type diagram in which the cumulative percentage of house-
holds, arrayed by size of income, is plotted on the horizontal axis, and the cumu-
lative percentage of income received by these households is plotted on the verti-
cal axis. The 45 degree diagonal represents the line of perfect equality, as along 
it the proportion of households everywhere is equal to the cumulative proportion 
of income received by them. The further the curves representing the actual 
distribution of income lie below the 45 degree diagonal, the greater is the in-
equality in the distribution of income. 
H It will be recalled from the earlier discussion that a ratio greater than one 
indicates that the share of a group in the total ot taxes is smaller than its 
share in the income total, and vice versa. Thus progression is indicated by lower 
ratios for the upper income groups. 
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income tax alone is more progressive than the total of all direct 
taxes levied against households. This difference is accounted for 
by the essentially regressive character of social security taxes. Thus, 
in contrast to the distribution of the tax burden between social 
groups, there is more progression in the tax structure from the 
point of view of the distribution of the tax total among the different 
income classes, but the actual amount of progression is quite mild. 
This latter point is apparent in the data pertaining to average 
income and taxes per household and per capita (see Tables XXII, 
XXIII). The disparities in the average income per household in 
each income bracket are, on the whole, much greater than the dis-
parities in their tax burdens. 
Before any further conclusions are suggested on the basis of 
data discussed in this section, some additional remarks are in order 
with respect to the per household and per capita income data. These 
data are in Tables XXII, XXIII, and XXIV.t5 The main purpose 
of the figures in these tables is to show the relative income position 
of households in each of the income ranges in yet another perspec-
tive. The differences between the upper and lower range are 
indeed great, as households in the lowest bracket have, on the 
average, incomes slightly less than half the national average, while 
households in the highest range have an average annual income 
more than twice the national average. The per capita data, unlike 
the per capita data for the different social classes, are similar in 
pattern to the data on income per household by income range. 
This is because the average number of persons per household is 
approximately the same for all income classes.16 As for taxes, we 
need simply to point out once more that the comparative tax bur-
dens per household and per capita contrast sharply with the com-
parative income averages. 
To sum up the analysis to this point, we suggest that the data 
considered support the following general conclusions. First, the dis-
tribution of income by income range shows a pattern of inequality 
similar to that prevailing in the distribution of income between 
social classes. Second, social security benefits and other transfer 
15 The dollar values in Table XXIV are also computed by using the official 
rate of exchange of 420 francs to the dollar. 
10 This is so because the households in the different social classes are not 
necessarily concentrated in one income range. Thus even though the number of 
persons per household differs as between social classes, the number of persons per 
household is approximately the same in each of the income classes. 
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expenditures are directed primarily to households in the lower 
ranges of the income scale, hence they serve to redress some of the 
inequalities in the initial distribution of factor income. In other 
words, both the data pertaining to the distribution of income be-
tween social classes and the distribution of income by income range 
show that the structure of transfer expenditures is progressive-
i.e., the groups least favorably situated in the matter of income 
benefit to the greatest extent from such expenditures. Third, and in 
contrast to the situation as between social classes, there is a mild 
progression in the structure of direct taxation as it affects the 
different income classes. But the degree of progression is, in any 
Fase, slight, and can hardly be termed equitable in view of the 
large disparities between income averages in the different income 
brackets. And, finally, it may be concluded that the relatively feeble 
degree of progression in France's tax structure means that very 
little-if any-vertical redistribution of income is effected in the 
economy. The progressive structure of benefits, in other words, may 
be nullified in whole or part by the indirect-and regressive-char-
acter of the tax system as a whole. As long as the overwhelming 
proportion of transfer payments or welfare expenditures are 
financed by indirect taxation, the real gains or losses that different 
income and social groups experience must remain obscure. 
TABLE XXII 
Income and Taxes per Household by Income Range: 1952 







Taxes Percent of 
Income Range 
Less than 535,900 francs 
535,900 to 932,000 francs 
932,000 to 1,398,000 francs 
Over 1.398,000 francs 
























Income and Taxes per Capita by Income Range: 1952 
(in francs and percent) 
Income Percent Taxes Percent of 
per of National per Income per 
Capita Average Capita Capita 
Income Range 
Less than 172,500 francs 122,684 50.2 3,375 2.8 
172,500 to 300,000 francs 226,634 92.8 10,507 4.6 
300,000 to 450,000 francs 329,036 134.7 19,569 5.9 
Over 450,000 francs 519,512 212.7 35,122 6.8 
A verage for the Economy 244,249 100:0 12,559 TI 
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TABLE XXIV 
Income and Taxes per Household and per Capita by Income Range: 1952 
(in dollars) 
Income per Taxes per 
Household Household 
Income Range 
Less than $1,530 $1,085 $ 30 
$1,530 to $2,662 2,041 94 
$2,662 to $3,994 2,916 173 
Over $3,994 4,648 314 
Average for the Economy $2,179 $1l2 
Income per Taxe~ per 
Capita Capita 
Income Range 
Less than $410 $ 351 $ 10 
$410 to $712 647 30 
$712 to $1,071 940 56 
Over $1,071 1,484 IOn 
Average for the Economy $ 698 '$1tl 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME WITHIN SOCIAL CLASSES 
The final step in our discussion of the distribution of money 
income in France is to analyze the distribution of income within the 
social groupings discussed earlier in this chapter. This procedure 
not only will illuminate further some of the points already dis-
cussed, but will permit us to pinpoint more exactly the areas of 
relative poverty and affulence in France's economy. Data just 
analyzed show quite conclusively that the distribution of money 
income in France is relatively unequal, as respects both social classes 
and income brackets. But the pattern of income distribution pre-
vailing in the economy as a whole is not necessarily duplicated 
within the different social groups. Consequently, our purpose in 
this section will be, first, to show in what parts of the economy in-
equality in income distribution is most pronounced; and, second, to 
indicate the extent to which welfare expenditures reduce In-
equalities within social classes. 
To begin, we shall examine the major sources of personal in-
come within the social groups treated in this study, and by range 
of income. These data are found in Table XXV. By and large 
the pattern pertaining to the origins of personal income for each 
social category is similar to the pattern for the whole economy. 
That is to say, households in the lowest income brackets in each 
social class derive a substantial portion of their money income from 
transfer payments. For households in the lowest income bracket, the 
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proportions range from 14.8 percent in the agricultural sector to 
77.6 percent for the nonactive population. For all the social classes, 
the proportionate share of transfer payments in the personal in-
come total declines as one moves from the lower to the upper income 
ranges. This means simply that within the social classes, as well 
as for the economy as a whole, the transfer mechanism operates 
mainly in favor of the lower-income groups. 
TABLE XXV 
Origins of Personal Income within Social Groups 
and by Income Range: 1952 
(in percent) 
Income Range· 
A B C 
Agriculture 
Income from Production 85.2 91.5 93.0 
Transfer Income 14.8 8.5 7.0 
Self-Employed 
Income from Production 66.7 84.3 96.1 
Transfer Income 33.3 15.7 3.9 
Wage-Earners 
Income from Production 68.5 83.3 88.0 
Transfer Income 31.5 16.7 12.0 
Nonactive 
Income hom Production 22.4 12.6 48.4 
Transfer Income 77.6 87.4 51.6 
• The income ranges are as follows: 
A: Less than 535,900 francs 
D: 535,900 to 932,000 francs 
c: 932,000 to 1,398,000 francs 










Although the over-all pattern of transfer payments is similar 
for all social groups, there are, nevertheless, some differences of 
significance between the groups. In the agricultural sector, for 
example, transfer payments as a source of personal income are of less 
importance for all income brackets than for any other social class, 
with the exception of the two highest income ranges in the self-
employed group. Households in the lowest income bracket for the 
self-employed category derive a surprisingly large proportion of 
their income from transfer payments, the amount being 33.1 per-
cent. This implies a low standard of living which contrasts rather 
sharply with the more affluent average for self-employed house-
holds. But this is mitigated by the fact that only a very small pro-
portion of households in the self-employed group find themselves 
in the lowest income range. For wage-earners, transfer payments 
are an important source of income for all income ranges, although 
their relative importance is still greatest for households in the lowest 
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brackets. Among the nonactive population, transfer payments are 
the major source of income for households in all but the highest 
income bracket in this social category. In a general way the data 
in Table XXV also show that as between social classes transfer pay-
ments as a source of personal income are of greater relative sig-
nificance for wage-earners and the nonactive population for all in-
come ranges, and that within each of the social classes, transfer 
payments are relatively more important the lower the income level 
of the household. 
In Table XXVI the data are arrayed to show the distribution 
of income before and after receipt of transfer payments within each 
of the social classes. These data, which also array households ac-
cording to income range, permit us to see the extent to which there 
are important differences between the social classes in the matter 
of income equality. The figures also show which of the social 
classes have the greatest proportion of their households in the 
lower income ranges, and thus provide an indication of the rela-
tive poverty or affluence characteristic of the various social group-
ings. 
TABLE XXVI 
Distribution of Households and Personal Income 
within Social Groups and by Income Range 
(percent of totals) 
Income Range' 
A B C 
Agriculture 
Number of Households 40.0 34.9 15.0 
Income born Production IS.5 32.9 22.5 
Transfer Income 35.1 33.6 IS.6 
Personal Income 19.9 33.0 22.2 
Self-Employed 
Number of Households 4.9 15.0 4S.1 
Income from Production 1.4 12.1 43.1 
Transfer Income 11.4 R5.0 27.2 
Personal Income 2.1 13.5 42.1 
Wage-Earners 
Number of Households 30.0 52.5 14.5 
Income from Production 16.4 51.6 23.7 
Transfer Income 33.9 46.6 14.6 
Personal Income 19.5 50.7 22.1 
Nonactive 
Number of Households 40.1 29.9 19.9 
Income hom Production 7.2 9.5 29.3 
Transfer Income IS.6 49.2 23.3 
Personal Income 13.7 32.2 25.9 
, The income ranges are as follows: 
A: Less than 535,900 francs 
B: 535,91}0 to 932,000 francs 
c: 932,000 to 1,398,000 francs 
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For the economy as a whole, 70.2 percent of the households have 
an annual income of less than 932,000 francs ($2,662). These same 
households receive 52.5 percent of the personal income total, includ-
ing transfers (Table XXI). By comparing these figures to similar 
ones for each social class, we can determine in approximate fashion 
whether or not the distribution of income within the individual 
classes is more or less unequal than that prevailing in the economy 
as a whole. 
In the agricultural sector 74.9 percent of the households are 
located in the lowest two income brackets, and these households 
receive 52.9 percent of the personal income total in this segment 
of the economy. The comparative figures for wage-earners are 82.5 
and 70.2 percent respectively, while for the nonactive population 
70.2 percent of the households are in the two lower income brackets, 
and they obtain but 45.9 percent of the income total. It is only in 
the self-employed class that we find a sharp departure from the 
over-all pattern, for in this category only 19.9 percent of the house-
holds are found in the two bottom income classes. These same 
households receive 15.6 percent of the income total for this class. 
For the economy as a whole, then, the concentration of households 
in the lower ranges of the income scale is least for the self-employed 
segment of the population, and greatest for the other three classes. 
This is in line with conclusions reached in the first section of this 
chapter concerning the relative income position of households in 
the different social classes. 
The extent to which the transfer mechanism reduces income in-
equalities within the social classes is readily discerned from the 
data in Table XXVI. If we again look at the position of households 
in the two lowest income brackets, it is apparent that transfer pay-
ments have their greatest impact in the nonactive category. The 
70 percent of the households in this class having annual incomes of 
less than 932,000 francs receive only 16.7 percent of the income total 
before transfers-i.e., factor income. But transfer payments boost 
the share of these households in the total to 45.9 percent. For the 
other three social classes the change in income distribution as a 
result of transfer payments is not nearly so great. In agriculture, 
transfers increase the proportionate share of income received by 
households in the two lowest brackets from 51.4 to 52.9 percent. 
For the self-employed the change is from 13.5 to 15.6 percent and 
for the wage-earners, from 68.0 to 70.2 percent. In sum, the system 
of transfer expenditures has its most significant impact upon the 
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distribution of income within the nonactive part of the population. 
For the other social groups, it is true, there is a reduction in 111-
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The distribution of initial or factor income and the distribution 
of personal income after receipt of transfer payments is depicted 
graphically for each of the social classes in Diagrams VI through 
IX. In these diagrams, the percentage distribution of households is 
arrayed on the horizontal axis and the percentage distribution of 
income on the vertical axis. The extent to which the curves repre-
senting the actual distribution of income depart from the line of 
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equal distribution gives us a graphic picture of income distribu-
tion before and after the receipt of transfer payments.17 Inspection 
of these diagrams indicates that on a class basis the distribution of 
income is least unequal among the wage-earners and self-employed, 
and most unequal in the agricultural and nonactive sectors. The 
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17 These diagrams are constructed in the same manner as Diagram V. See Note 
13, this chapter. 
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class. Inspection also shows that transfer expenditures do the most 
to reduce inequalities in income distribtuion in the nonactive 
population. Transfers also reduce inequalities to a considerable 
extent among the wage-earners, but they do not have a very great 
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Diagram IX 
Distribution of Personal Income: 
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Our final comments in this section concern the net gain or loss 
that households in each of the income brackets and within each 
social class experience from the combined effects of social security 
benefits and social security taxes. These results are contained in 
Table XXVII. With the exception of the self-employed and the 
highest income bracket of the nonactive population, the general 
pattern within each income class is the same as that of the whole 
economy. That is to say, households in each of the income ranges 
enjoy a net gain in money income from the system, although again 
the amount of this gain is greatest in the lower income brackets. 
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It is only within the self-employed category that we find evidence of 
a vertical redistribution of income by means of the social security 
system. In this class, the net loss of income among households in 
the two upper income brackets is almost equal to the gain in income 
experienced by households in the two lower brackets. In the non-
active class, households in the top income range have a net loss, but 
the amount of the latter is insignificant in comparison with the 
gains obtained by households in the other three income classes. 
The reasons for the existence of a net gain in income for both 
social and income classes have already been discussed, and need not 
detain us again. This means, though, that the conclusions reached 
earlier with respect to the incidence of the full costs of the social 
security system apply equally to the situation as it exists within 
the social classes. 
TABLE XXVII 
Net Transfers of Income by Social Groups and 
by Income Range: 1952 
(billions of francs) 
Income Range'* 
A B C 
Agriculture 
Social Security Income 26 24 11 
Social Security Taxes 3 2 I 
Net Gain or Loss 23 22 10 
Self-Employed 
Social Securi ty Income 5 26 19 
Social Security Taxes 8 26 
Net Gain or Loss -5 Is -7 
Wage-Earners 
Social Security Income 260 401 110 
Social Security Taxes 33 109 49 
Net Gain or Loss 227 292 6I 
Nonactive 
Social Security Income 110 290 140 
Social Security Taxes I I 6 
Net Gain or Loss 109 289 1M 
.... The income ranges are as follows: 
A: Less than 535,900 francs 
B: 535,900 to 932,000 francs 
C: 932,000 to 1,398,000 francs 














The most important findings that have resulted from the data 
analyzed in this chapter have been indicated at appropriate intervals 
in the preceding discussion of the different facets of income dis-
tribution in France. In concluding this chapter it is appropriate, 
perhaps, to restate briefly the most important conclusions of the 
analysis. Insofar as France's major social classes are concerned, the 
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picture is one of relative inequality in the distribution of personal 
income. Inequality in the distribution of factor income between 
social classes is mitigated to some extent by the transfer mechanism; 
the latter serves chiefly to bolster the income position of persons 
in the nonactive population. This group has the least favored in-
come position of any social class. Social security benefits and other 
welfare expenditures are on the whole progressive in their effects. 
No such progression obtains, however, with respect to the tax bur-
den assumed by the different social classes. In short, the tax struc-
ture cannot be said to be equitable, as farmers and the self-employed 
are in a privileged position vis-a-vis wage-earners and the nonactive 
population. 
For the distribution of income between income classes, the pic-
ture is much the same. A considerable inequality in the initial dis-
tribution of income is modified by the system of transfer payments, 
the bulk of which are directed to households in the lower income 
ranges. That tax structure as it pertains to the allocation of the 
tax burden among the different income classes is seen as slightly 
progressive, but not sufficiently so to compensate for the large dis-
parities between the income position of households in the various 
income brackets. There is no evidence to suggest any substantial 
vertical redistribution of income between income classes through 
the social security system. On the contrary, the dependence of 
the system on indirect taxes for most of its financing suggests, at 
the very least, that the beneficiaries of the system probably pay, via 
the mechanism of the price system, most of the latter's real costs. 
Finally, we analyzed the distribution of income within each of 
the social groups. Within each group we found a similar pattern of 
inequality in income distribution, modified in greater or lesser 
degree by the mechanism of transfers. Interclass inequality is 
greatest in the nonactive and agricultural sectors of the population, 
and least for wage-earners and the self-employed. Social security 
benefits are, on the whole, progressive in their impact within the 
social classes, and for the nonactive population they, along with 
other welfare expenditures, bring about a significant reduction in 
income inequality. Within each social class, households in all of 
the income ranges enjoyed a net gain in money income, with the 
major exception of households in the two highest income brackets 
for the self-employed group. In fact, it is only within the latter 
category that we find any evidence of a vertical redistribution of 
income via the social security system. 
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THE WELFARE STATE, as the phrase has been defined and used in this study, is largely a postwar phenomenon. In France, as in the United Kingdom, it sprang from a vague though 
widespread popular feeling that military victory over the Axis 
powers would not be enough unless it was accompanied by the 
creation of a more just, a more humane economic and social order. 
It arose, too, out of a popular revulsion against real and imagined 
shortcomings of prewar European capitalism, particularly the abuse 
of monopoly power, the exploitation of labor, and excessive and 
widespread inequalities in the distribution of wealth and income. 
In Britain the Labour Party led in the assault on the social and 
economic institutions of prewar capitalism. After Labour's victory 
in the 1945 general election, the party began erecting a structure of 
socialism in the United Kingdom. The Labour Party was only able 
to maintain itself in power for five years, but the welfare state sur-
vived Labour's defeat, and remains, perhaps, the most durable part 
of the edifice erected after 1945. In France there was no single party 
of the left to formulate and champion demands for economic and 
social reform. The prewar political parties and coalitions had 
been discredited with the crushing collapse of the Third Republic 
in 1940, so the whole matter of economic change was left to the 
men of the Resistance. The National Council of Resistance, 
organized in June, 1942, united in one body the Free French move-
ment of General de Gaulle and the major resistance groups in oc-
cupied France. After the Liberation the Council became the nucleus 
of the Provisional Government. The demands of the resistance 
movement for postwar economic and social renovation in France 
were formally expressed in the "Resistance Charter," issued at 
Algiers in March, 1944. 
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The Resistance demanded establishment of a "true economic and 
social democracy," a slogan vague enough to mean whatever par-
ticular groups and interests on the French left wanted it to mean. 
As for the Charter itself, it envisaged a program of economic and 
social reform on two broad fronts. The first need was to destroy 
the alleged control that the great industrial and financial trusts-
the so·called 200 families of prewar fame-exercised over the whole 
of economic life in France. As in the United Kingdom, this was 
to be achieved primarily through the nationalization of key in-
dustries, and economic planning in the national interest. Under 
the heading of economic reform the Charter demanded the "rational 
organization of an economy which will assure the subordination of 
private interest to the general interest ... intensification of na-
tional production along lines determined by the state after consulta-
tion with representatives of all elements in production ... " and 
the "return to the nation of the great monopolies in the means of 
production, the sources of energy, mineral wealth, and the large 
banks .... " 
The second need, in the eyes of the Resistance leaders, was the 
creation in France of machinery to insure all citizens of a minimum 
standard of well-being, and to bring about a more equitable distri-
bution of the national income-in short, the creation of a welfare 
state. The phrase "welfare state" does not appear in the Resistance 
Charter, but the wording of the latter clearly spells out the intention 
of the Resistance leadership to use the restored power of the French 
state to effect the kind of social revolution envisaged in the idea of 
the welfare state. 
Unlike Britain, there did not exist in France after the Libera-
tion a single political party with sufficient popular support to be-
come the instrument for the economic and social reform planned by 
the Resistance. The Constituent Assembly, elected in October, 1945, 
was dominated by the three big parties of the Resistance, the Com-
munists, the Socialists, and the Popular Republicans. Even though 
each of these parties had endorsed the Charter prior to the general 
elections, they were by no means in unanimous agreement as to 
the actual reforms necessary to put its principles into effect. Within 
a year, in fact, the coalition of the Resistance parties disintegrated, 
and after this France, under the Fourth Republic, slipped rapidly 
and easily back into the old, prewar habits of government instability 
and shaky coalitions. 
The consequence of this was to tarnish and distort the Resistance 
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dream of a reborn France, purged of the weakness, the pettiness, and 
the corruption of the prewar regime. It is true that the Provisional 
Government wrought significant changes in the economic structure 
of France, but in no instance were the reforms as far· reaching as 
desired by the Resistance. A number of important nationalizations 
were carried out in 1945 and 1946, but nationalization was not car-
ried to the point envisaged by the Resistance groups, nor, for that 
matter, as far as the Labour Party carried nationalization in Great 
Britain. Some of the nationalization in France, moreover, was 
purely punitive and unrelated to any comprehensive plan for eco-
nomic control. Furthermore, machinery for national economic plan-
ning in the sense of centralized control over the use of the econ-
omy's resources was never even seriously considered after the 
Liberation. French economic planning since the war has been 
centered in the various modernization plans directed by the Com-
missariat General du Plan. While the latter body can point to 
many remarkable achievements in modernizing and transforming 
the economic structure of France, its powers, save for some control 
over investment funds, have largely been persuasive. Finally even 
the welfare state, which was to have been perhaps the great social 
achievement of the Resistance, emerged in stunted form. The sys-
tem of social security, for example, was intended to be uni"ersal, 
benefitting all sections of the population equally, but the bitter 
opposition of the self-employed above all, as well as of the bene-
ficiaries of existing schemes, prevented this. The result, as we have 
seen, was a structure of extreme complexity with an absence of 
uniformity as respects the benefits available to different sectors of 
the population. 
But the main theme of this chapter is not the frustration of the 
hopes of the Resistance for a reborn France. The concern of this 
study has been the welfare state in France, and our purpose now is 
to offer some final evaluation of this phenomenon. How well, in 
other words, does it work? Has the welfare state in France achieved 
the objectives of its architects? Has it, on balance, been beneficial 
to France and the French economy? These are some of the questions 
we must now try to answer. 
At the onset one point can be disposed of rather quickly. This 
has to do with the permanence of the welfare state apparatus in 
France. In spite of what has been said above about the incomplete-
if not somewhat jerry-built-structure of France's welfare state, 
there is no doubt in the writer's judgement that it has become a 
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permanent fixture in French economic life. As in the United King-
dom, and to a lesser extent in the United States, the government of 
France, irrespective of its political coloration, is committed to a 
vast and complicated scheme for the redistribution of a significant 
portion of the national income. To many, notably conservatives, 
this is a fact to be deplored, but it is less than realistic to expect, 
short of an unprecedented social upheaval, a dismantling of the 
welfare state apparatus. In France, no less than in Great Britain, 
the welfare state has been institutionalized, and what can be ex-
pected in the future is little more than "tinkering" in the hope of 
improving its functioning. 
The proportion of the French national income that is redistrib-
uted via the machinery of the central government is, as we saw 
in Chapter 3, about twice as large as it is in the United Kingdom, 
and almost five times greater than in the United States. Has this 
enormous redistribution of the national income created in France 
the kind of a welfare society envisaged by the architects of the idea? 
In one sense at least the answer to this question is "yes." To the 
extent that the welfare state idea means protection for the worker 
against the hazards and uncertainties of contemporary economic 
life, France has been as successful as any other nation in establish-
ing the necessary machinery for this purpose. In terms of the com-
prehensiveness of the system, the French worker is well protected 
against the risks of industrial life. The major uncertainties of an 
industrial society are those of unemployment, premature death or 
disability of the head of the household, prolonged illness, and old 
age. France's social security system provides a vast array of bene-
fits to cope with all these risks; the system can be said to be suc-
cessful in that it meets the demand of the workers, which is par-
ticularly pronounced in France, for freedom from continued 
anxiety about the future. 
By American standards, to be sure, the amounts available for 
different categories of social benefits are meager, indeed in some 
instances pitifully meager. But this is simply a consequence of the 
fact that the average real income in France is lower than that of 
Britain or the United States. The point has been made before in 
this study that what a nation can afford in the way of a redistri-
bution of income for welfare purposes is in a broad sense a function 
of its real per capita income. Moreover, the amount of these bene-
fits must be yiewed in their proper context, which is in this instance 
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a society in which nearly one-third of the wage-earner households 
have incomes of less than $30 per week. 
It would not be correct to say categorically that France's social 
security system provides an acceptable minimum standard of well-
being for all French citizens. This, along with protection against 
the economic hazards of industrial life, is one of the major ob-
jectives of the welfare state. There still exist too many gaps in 
the system for this to be completely true. But since there are no 
absolutely objective standards of material well-being, what is ac-
ceptable as a minimum level is largely relative to the general 
standard of living prevailing in a society. If France's welfare state 
is viewed in this context, it is only right to say that it has achieved 
much of worth in this respect. 
Perhaps the most important facet of the welfare state in France 
is the system of family allowances. This, as pointed out earlier, is 
the really unique feature of the system. One would hesitate, per-
haps, to attribute a cause and effect relationship to the family allow-
ance system and the postwar increase in the birth rate, but it would 
not be imprudent to maintain that this system has been at the very 
least a factor in France's postwar demographic revolution. The 
latter is, in the writer's view, one of the most hopeful of develop-
ments in the whole postwar picture, for France is literally a na-
tion that is being reborn. It is on its way to becoming one of the 
youngest nations in Western Europe, and within the next decade 
or two France seems certain to be radically transformed both eco-
nomically and socially as a result of the changing population picture. 
If the welfare state and its system of family allowances has contri-
buted to this, then this is, in the last analysis, all to the good. 
Another, and in the eyes of some the most important, facet of 
the welfare state concerns its impact on the distribution of income. 
For the Labour Party in the United Kingdom, as well as for leaders 
on the political left in France, a more equal distribution of the 
national income has been and remains one of the major objectives 
of the welfare state. Has this objective been satisfactorily achieved 
in France? There cannot be, unfortunately, any simple and direct 
answer to this question. As the data examined in the previous chap-
ters indicate, the pattern of income distribution resulting from wel-
fare expenditures is in a sense obscure and subject to varying 
interpretations. It is true that the distribution of money or personal 
income is less unequal after welfare or transfer expenditures than 
it is before, and this is the situation with respect to the distribu-
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tion of income between both social classes and income classes. The 
pattern of welfare expenditures is, as we have found, essentially 
progressive. But these rather dear-cut results are rendered obscure 
by the peculiarities of the French tax system. The latter depends 
enormously upon indirect taxation to finance not only general 
government expenditures but the bulk of welfare expenditures as 
well. This results in confusion with respect to the real incidence of 
the costs of government, and thus no single generalization about 
the pattern of income redistribution is possible. It does seem to 
the writer, however, that two points of significance should be 
stressed. First, the data on France suggest strongly that only a 
limited vertical redistribution of income is brought about by the 
social security system. What the latter does, in general, is redistri-
bute income within the social and income classes rather than be-
tween these classes. Second, both the data pertaining to France and 
those pertaining to the United Kingdom examined in this study 
indicate that the growth of welfare expenditures brings with it an 
increase in the dependence of the government on indirect taxation 
as a revenue source. This would imply that there does exist some 
limit to the extent that any government can resort to direct taxes 
for all of its revenue needs. Such a limit is a nebulous matter, but 
it is, nevertheless, real. Insofar as the welfare state is concerned, 
the implication of indirect taxation is clear, as it means that a 
considerable portion of the real costs of welfare expenditures are 
borne, in the final analysis, by the beneficiaries of these expenditures. 
Thus we must remain somewhat agnostic with respect to the 
efficacy of the welfare state as an instrumentality for effecting any 
revolutionary change in the distribution of income. 
Beyond these more immediate questions having to do with the 
effectiveness of France's welfare state in relation to the latter's 
specific objectives, there lie broader issues of value that arise out 
of the growth of the welfare state in the postwar period. The issue 
of most fundamental concern is whether or not the welfare state is 
"good." This question has been the center of passionate contro-
versy throughout the whole postwar period. Partisans of the wel-
fare state idea argue that it represents the kind of social and eco-
nomic transformation necessary to achieve the humane and demo-
cratic society envisaged by the liberal and socialist traditions of the 
West, while its opponents argue with equal vigor that the whole 
idea is a mistake and will lead inevitably to the totalitarian state 
and the extinction of all forms of human liberty. This statement is 
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of course but an approximate resume of the extreme positions on 
both sides of the controversy, and is intended solely to illuminate 
the basic issue in the simplest possible terms. 
It is not our purpose here, however, to enter into a long discussion 
as to whether or not the welfare state is "good." This after all is a 
highly subjective matter, and there can be no final answer to the 
question. In fact it really does not serve any particular usefulness 
to put the matter in this context. The many very real problems as-
sociated with the welfare state idea will be more readily resolved 
if we put the matter into an entirely different context. 
The thesis advanced here is that the modern welfare state is only 
the most recent manifestation of a powerful and perhaps irresistible 
trend not only in Western society but in the world as a whole. This 
trend is a persistent and ever-surging drive for more equality in the 
distribution of real income. In a most vital sense the distribution 
of income is a key problem in any society, and the failure of the 
society to solve this problem in a satisfactory manner will in-
evitably lead to violent and costly social upheaval. In essence Marx-
ism is nothing more than the most violent kind of challenge to the 
alleged failure of capitalism to achieve distributive justice. Since 
the inception of capitalism, much of the social and economic history 
of the 'West revolves about the never-ceasing effort to modify existing 
institutions and create new arrangements to cope with this force. 
Today the setting is world-wide, for the cry for economic develop-
ment and progress heard all over the world is, at the same time, a 
cry for more equality in the distribution of income. The vast dis-
parities in wealth and income between the developed and under-
developed areas of the world can no longer be concealed. In the 
West in times past such disparities were not tolerated indefinitely 
once general awareness of them arose, and we are witnessing today a 
similar phenomenon on a world-wide scale. That is to say, new 
institutions and new social and economic arrangements are in the 
making, and while their future form cannot be safely predicted, one 
can be certain that they are being born out of the drive for a more 
equal distribution of real income. 
If we view the welfare state of contemporary Western society in 
this perspective, the question of whether or not it is "good" in 
some absolute sense really becomes quite meaningless. It must be 
viewed as an aspect-and only one aspect-of the trend discussed 
above. In this context the relevant problem is not one of choosing 
between a welfare state or no welfare state. In most Western coun-
Reflections on the Welfare State / 107 
tries, including the United States, the idea of the welfare state has 
taken root and has become, in greater or lesser degree, em?odied 
in institutions of great permanence. The real problem concerns the 
efficacy of this particular phenomenon as a means of satisfying the 
pressure for more equality in the distribution of income. This again 
is a matter about which there can be no absolute answers, but in 
concluding this study the following final conclusions are offered. 
First, it is held that some form of "welfare statism" is no doubt 
inevitable in advanced societies, particularly the advanced capita-
listic societies of the West. There is, in the writer's view, nothing 
to be feared in this in nations with strong and lively democratic 
traditions. There is, in other words, nothing in recent experience 
to suggest that the worst fears of the opponents of the welfare state 
will materialize. It is further maintained that the welfare state 
concept is simply the latest-and not necessarily the last-social in-
novation that has arisen to cope with the continued demands for 
more equality in the distribution of income. 
The second and final conclusion of our study is that the efficacy 
of the welfare state as a means to cope with the problem of the 
distribution of income is limited. In other words, the welfare state 
idea may achieve desirable results with respect to the distribution 
of income in a society up to a point, but thereafter the principle of 
diminishing returns sets in. The key here, of course, is the phrase 
"up to a point," and on this, unfortunately, we have little in the 
way of objective criteria. Actually this is a matter that must be left, 
in a sense, to the judgement of public opinion, shaped, as usually 
is the case, by a society's intellectual and political leadership. About 
all that we can suggest as a general principle is that a society must 
become a "welfare state" to the extent necessary to prewnt dis-
integration and conflict over the question of distributive justice. 
Once this is achieved, the continuing challenge of a better distribu-
tion of income is best met by measures that raise productivity and 
real income for the whole society. In the final analysis, productivity 
remains the real key to economic well-being, but advances in pro-
ductivity can only take place within the setting of a stable social 
order. The desirability of the welfare state must finally be adjudged 
in terms of its contributions to this latter goal. 
Appendix 
The major source of data for this study has been the statistics 
of national income and expenditure compiled by the French govern-
ment. Basic data on the French national income are published 
periodically by the Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs, and 
Planning in the series Statistiques et Etudes Financieres. Compila-
tion of national income data is the joint responsibility of the 
Service des etudes economiques et fiancieres (S.E.E.F.), and the 
1nstitut national de la statistique et des etudes economiques 
(I.N .S.E.E.), both of which are a part of the Ministry of Finance, 
Economic Affairs, and Planning. The work of these organizations is 
reviewed and approved by the Commission des comptes et des 
budgets economiques de la nation, formerly headed by M. Mendes-
France. 
French national income and social accounting is a postwar 
development, as no effort was made by the French government prior 
to the war to compile national income and product statistics on any 
systematic basis. Between 1946 and 1950 this task was delegated to 
the Monnet Plan administration (Commissariat General du Plan), 
but after 1950 the responsibility was shifted to the S.E.E.F. and 
I.N.S.E.E. 
In 1951 the Commission des comptes et des budgets economiques 
de la nation undertook a major revision of postwar national income 
data, the results of which were published in the April-May, 1952, 
issue of Statistiques et Etudes Financieres under the title Les 
comptes de la nation pour l'annee 1949. This is a document of key 
importance, as it established the basic conceptual framework em-
ployed in French national income and social accounting. The docu-
ment is comparable in explanatory scope to the National Income 
Supplements of the U. S. Department of Commerce. 
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A second major revision of postwar data was published by the 
Ministry of Finance in 1955 under the title Rapport sur les comptes 
de la nation. Volume I presents a homogeneous series of data for 
the period 1949-55, and Volume II consists of a detailed report on 
the methods and sources utilized in French national income account· 
ing. These two volumes have provided a large share of the statis-
tical data utilized in this study. The source for prewar data is the 
report Les comptes economiques de l'annee 1938, published in 1957 
by the Ministry of Finance. This is a revision of the pioneer in-
vestigation into national income in 1938 carried out by the Com-
missariat General du Plan in 1947 and published under the title 
Estimation du revenu national franfais. No comparable data on 
national income have yet been published by the Ministry for the 
postwar years prior to 1949 or for the war period, 1939-45. 
The following tables present in absolute amount the most im-
portant data on income and expenditure utilized in this study. The 
sources for data pertaining to the United Kingdom and the United 
States are given in the appropriate tables. 
TABLE XXVIII 
Gross National Product and Expenditure in France: 1938, 1952 
(billions of francs) 
1938 1952 
Sources of GNP 
Personal Consumption 329 9,442 
Government Consumption 58 2,292 
Gross Domestic Investment 59 2,675 
Net Foreign Investment - 2 - 270 
Gross National Product 444 14,139 
Allocations of GNP 
Compen~ation of Employees IR4 6,113 
Income of Unincorporated Enterprise 131 3,564 
Net Interest 8 15 
Dividend Income 15 367 
Corporate Income 18 696 
National Income 356 10,725 
Indirect Business Taxes 49 2,384 
Business Transfer Payments 31 
Less: Suhsidies Minus Current Surplus 
of Government Enterprise 
- 8 - 471 
Net National Product 397 12,669 
Capital Consumption Allowances 47 1,470 
Gross National Product 444 14,139 
Sources: 1938 Data: Ministeres des Affaire. tconomique et FinanancU:res, Les Comptes Econ· 
omiques de l'Annee 19)8, Paris. 1957. 
1952 Data: Ministere des Finances. des Affaires tconomique. et du Plan, Rapport 
sur les Comptes de la Nation. Paris, 1955. 
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TABLE XXIX 
Gross National Product and Expenditure in the 
United Kingdom and the United States: 1952 
United Kingdom United States 
(millions of pounds) (millions of dollars) 
SOfJTCes of GNP 
Personal Consumption 
Government Consumption 
Gross Domestic Investment 
Net Foreign Investment 
Gross National Product 
Allocations of GNP 
Compensation of Employees 
Income of Unincorporated Enterprise 
Corporate Income 
Other Property Income 
National Income 
Indirect Business Taxes 
Business Transfer Payments 
Statistical Discrepancy 
Less: Subsidies Minus Current Surplus 
of Government Enterprise 
Net National Product 
Capital Consumption Allowances 



































U.S. Data: Dept. of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, July. 1953. 
TABLE XXX 
Personal Income and Outlay in the United 
Kingdom and the United States: 1952 
United States 
(millions of dollars) 
United Kingdom 
(millions of pounds) 
Sources of Income 
Wages and Salaries 
Individual Enterprise 
Other Property Income 
Total Factor Income 
Transfers from Government 
Transfers from Business 






































U.S. Data: Dept. of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, July, 1953. 
Appendix / 111 
TABLE XXXI 
Government Receipts and Expenditure in the 
United Kingdom and the United Slates: 1952 
United Kingdom 





Total Direct Taxes 
Social Security Taxes 
Individuals 
Business Firms 
Total Social Security Taxes 
Indirect Business Taxes 
Total Tax Revenue 
Other Receipts 




Interest on Debt 
To Individuals 
Subsiuies to Business" 
Total Transfers 
Total Government Expenditure 
Surplus (+) or Deficit (-) 





































Sources: U.K. Data: Cmnd. 123, White Paper on National Income, 1957. 
U.S. Data: Dept. of Commerce, Survey oj Current Business, July, 1953. 
TABLE XXXII 
National Income in France: 1938,1952-55 
(billions of francs) 
1938 1952 1953 
Origin of Income 
Compensation of Employees 
Wages and Salaries 173 4,914 5,106 
Supplements 259 270 
Social Security 









Total Labor Income 184 6TI3 ~ ~ ~ 
Unincorporated Enterprise 131 3,564 3,536 3,668 3,954 
Net Interest 8 15 26 30 35 
Corporate Income 33 1,063 1,147 1,197 1,273 
National Income 356 10,725 . 1l,024 . 1I,702 . 12,563 
Sources: 1938 Data: Ministere des Affaires li:.conomiques et Financieres, Les Comptes £C01l-
omiques de fAnn.!e 1938, Paris, 1957. 
1952 Data: Ministere des Finances, des Affaires li:.conomiques et du Plan, Rapport 
sur les Comptes de la Nation, Paris, 1955. 
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TABLE XXXIII 
Personal income and Outlay in France: 1938,1952-55 
(billions of francs) 
1938 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Sources of income 
Wages and Salaries 173 4,914 5,106 5,483 5,908 
Unincorporated Enterprise 131 3,413 3,354 3,489 3,793 
Interest Income 26 III 86 III 118 
Dividend Income 13 367 389 422 46-t 
Net Income from Abroad 109 89 99 101 
Total Factor Income ~ 8,914 9,024 9,604 10,384 
Transfer Income 
Social Security 19 1,214 1,325 1,517 1,601 
Supplements- 259 270 284 293 
Assistance 17 321 352 369 411 
War Damages 148 149 164 175 
Total Transfer Income -00 1,942 2,096 2,334 2,480 
Personal Income 379 10,856 11,120 11,938 12,864 
Personal Outlay 
Consumption 329 9,442 9,746 10,315 10,996 
Taxes 
Income 16 256 318 311 310 
Social Security 2 279 321 343 367 
Total Taxes J:8 535 639 654 (ffj 
Personal Savings ~ 879 735 969 1,191 
Personal Income 379 10,856 1l,120 11,938 12,864 
• Social security benefits paid directly by l:ublic and private enterprises, 
Sources: 19~8 Data: Minist~re des Affaires conomiques et Financi~es, Les Comptes £Can· 
omiques de /'Annee 19)8, Paris, 1957, 
1952 Data: Minis~re des Finances, des Affaires £conomiques et du Plan, Rapport 
SliT les Comptes de la Nation, Paris, 1955. 
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TABLE XXXIV 
Government Receipts and Expenditures in France: 1938, 1952-55 





Total Direct Taxes 






Business Firms 10 
Total Social Security Taxes --r2 
Indirect Business Taxes 49 
Total Tax Revenue --8-1 
Other Receipts· 2 
Total Government Receipts---"S3 
Government Expenditure 
Government Consumption 58 
Government Transfers 
Interest on Debt 18 
Social Securi ty 19 
Assistance 17 
War Damages 
Subsidies to Businesst 8 
Total Transfers ~ 
Total Government Expenditure 120 
Surplus <+) or Deficit (-) - 37 
Total Government Receipts ---s3 





















































































t Less current surplus of government enterprise, 
SourceS: 1938 Data: Ministere des Affaires £conomiques et Financieres, Les Comptes £con-
omiques de I' Annee 19J8, Paris, 1957, 
1952 Data: Ministere des Finances, des Mfaires £conomiques et du Plan, Rapport 
sur les Comptes de la Nation, Paris, 1955, 
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TABLE XXXV 
Personal Income and Outlay by Social Groups: 1952 
Ibillions of francs) 
Self- \Vage- Non-
Farmers Employed Earner!' Active Total 
Sources of Income 
Farm Production 
'Vages and Salaries 1I7 272 3,938 262 4,589 
Unincorporated Enterprise 1,313 1,811 205 71 3,400 
Other Property Income 40 88 158 195 481 
Total 1,470 2,171 4,301 528 8,470 
From Transfers 
Social Securi ty 68 56 798 544 1,466 
Assistance 46 32 133 1I0 321 
Other 20 52 22 54 148 
Total ------r34 140 953 708 1.935 
Personal Income 1,604 2,311 5,254 1,236 10,405 
Personal Outlay 
Consumption 1,512 1,953 4,617 1,036 9,118 
Taxes 
Income 15 94 130 17 256 
Social Security 7 55 202 15 279 
Total ------z2 149 332 ~ 535 
Personal Savings 70 209 305 168 752 
Personal Income 1,604 2,311 5,254 1,236 10,405 
Source: Ministere des Finances, des Affaires tconomiques 
Comptes de la Nation, Vol. II, Paris, 1955_ 
et du Plan, Rapport sur les 
TABLE XXXVI 
Personal Income and Outlay by Income Range: 1952 
Ibillions of francs) 
A B 
Sources of Personal Income 
From Production 
Wages and Salaries 738 2,251 
Individual Enterprise 298 713 
Other Property Income 9 54 
Total 1,045 3,018 
From Transfers 
Social Insurance 401 741 
Assistance 96 120 
Other 21 25 
Total 518 -----s86 
Personal Income 1,563 3,904 
Pasonal Outlay 
Consumption 1,622 3,506 
Taxes 
Income 6 61 
Social Security 37 120 
Total -----:r3 181 
Personal Savings - 102 217 
Personal Income 1,563 3,904 
• The income ranges are as follows: 
A: Less than 535,900 francs 
B: 535,900 to 932,000 francs 
C: 932,000 to 1,398,000 francs 


































Source: Ministere des Finances, des Affaire. tconomiques et du Plan, Rapport sur les 
Comptes de la Nation, Vol. II, Paris, 1955_ 
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TABLE XXXVII 
Sources of Personal Income within Social Groups 
and by Income Range: 1952 
(billions of francs) 
A 
Agriculture 
Income from Production 272 
Transfer Income 47 
Personal Income -m 
Self-Employed 
Income from Production 32 
Transfer Income 16 
Personal Income ---"4s 
Wage-Earners 
Income from Production 703 
Transfer Income 323 
Personal Income 1,026 
Nonactive 
Income from Production 38 
Transfer Income 132 
Personal Income J:7O 
Total All Groups 
Income from Production 1,045 
Transfer Income 518 
Personal Income 1,563 
• The income ranges are as follows: 
A: Less than 535,900 francs 
B: 535.900 to 932.000 francs 
C: 932,000 to 1,398,000 francs 


















































Source: Ministere des Finances, des Affaires ~conomiques et du Plan, Rapport sur les 
Comptes de la Nation, Vol. II, Paris, 1955. 
TABLE XXXVIII 
Distribution of Households and Population by Social 






Households 788 689 295 198 
Population 3,221 2,816 1,209 804 
Self-Employt:d 
Households 91 274 875 585 
Population 295 885 2.829 1,891 
Wage-Earners 
Households 2,1l7 3,666 1,024 248 
Population 6.737 1l,669 3,258 786 
Nonactive 
Households 1,1l9 836 557 278 
Population 2,487 1,856 1.238 619 
Total 
Households 4,115 5,465 2.751 1,309 
Population 12,740 17,226 8,534 4,100 
• The income ranges are as follows: 
A: Less than 535,900 francs 
B: 535.900 to 932,000 francs 
C: 932,000 to 1,398,009 francs 












Source: Ministere des Finances, des Affaires ~conomiques et du Plan, Rapport sur ies 
Comptes de ia Nation, Vol. II, Paris, 1955. 
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